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The current paradigm of corporate governance theory suggests that the
Japanese main bank system and the German universal bank system encourage
socially optimal corporate decisionmaking. Unlike their Japanese and Ger-
man counterparts, American banks are barred from taking an active role in
corporate governance, both by laws restricting share ownership, and by legal
rules which hold banks liable for exerting managerial control over borrowers.
The debate among commentators has focused on whether the German and Jap-
anese systems should be viewed as alternatives to the American model. In this
article, Professors Macey and Miller challenge the current paradigm by dem-
onstrating that powerful banks may prevent equity claimants from undertaking
socially optimal risks, thereby hindering the development of robust capital
markets. They conclude that the most effective model is one which large-block
shareholders pose a credible threat to incumbent management and banks max-
imize their comparative advantage in controlling moral hazard.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholars have frequently criticized America's tradi-
tional system of corporate governance, routinely depicting it as having "sharply
constrained the development of multidimensional governance relationships."'
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In particular, scholars have argued that American mechanisms for monitoring
and controlling corporate managers are grossly inferior to those of Japan and
Germany. They describe American firms disparagingly as "Berle-Means" cor-
porations,2 with widespread share-ownership, separation of management and
risk-bearing, and signifiant agency conflicts between managers and sharehold-
ers.3 Despite some protestations of agnosticism, 4 the critics' tone makes it
clear that they regard the American system of corporate governance as inferior
because it fails to foster the sort of "relational investing" that leads to effective
monitoring by sophisticated intermediaries.5
At its core, the modem romanticism surrounding German and Japanese cor-
porate governance turns on the role played by commercial banks. The domi-
nant idea is that commercial banks, if allowed to function free of regulation, are
able to monitor and influence the business affairs of borrowing corporations.
United States law, however, limits banks' influence to a suboptimal level "[bly
restricting the size of banks and the scope and geographical range of their activ-
ities."'6 Because American banks lack both the power and incentive to monitor
their borrowers,
the monitoring role in the American corporate governance system is relegated
to those who provide only equity capital to the corporation-the shareholders.
This characteristic has forced American governance institutions to follow a
unique Berle-Means pattern of successive efforts, ranging from independent
directors to hostile takeovers, to bridge the separation of ownership and man-
agement in the face of dispersed shareholdings.7
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10, 13-16 (1991)
(discussing recent criticisms of the U.S. corporate governance system).
2. The term "Berle-Means" corporation is derived from the classic text describing the separation
of ownership and control in the large public corporation, ADOLPH A. BERt, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs,
TnE MODERN CoRPoRAroN AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
3. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that shareholder passivity, combined with disag-
gregated share ownership, allows management to dominate corporate governance at almost every turn.
See, e.g., Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corpo-
rate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 379, 413-14 (1994) (stating that the
American corporate governance system, with its structural emphasis on dominant management and
widespread shareownership, has led to self-interested and inefficient decisionmaking by management).
4. Mark Roe, one of the most important authors in this movement, claims to examine Germany
and Japan "not to argue that their corporate structures are better and should be mimicked, but to show
that different structures are possible." Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Ger-
many, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1997 (1993).
5. Roe, for example, writes that "the American pattern of fragmented shareholders with little
power is not inevitable" and that corporate "managers can share power with intermediaries without
making the corporate world fall apart." 1d.; see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 811, 813-14 (1992) (noting that, absent
America's legal restrictions, institutional investors can and do effectively monitor corporations); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. Rnv.
124, 127 (1994) (arguing that appropriate changes in legal rules will allow institutional investors to
promote the quality, independence, and accountability of the board); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disad-
vantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 76-77
("The interests of capital providers must be aligned with those of the corporation so that investors seek
out high-quality information that fosters more appropriate investment choices.").
6. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 989.
7. Id. at 990.
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In short, critics suggest that American banks should play a role similar to
that of German universal banks and of Japanese main banks, monitoring and
shaping the management of corporate borrowers.8 Commentators have explic-
itly argued that without major changes in American banking law and practice
"the United States is likely ...to lag behind its European and Japanese
competitors."9
In this article, we cast doubt on the desirability of commercial bank in-
volvement in corporate governance. We argue that proponents of bank in-
volvement not only fail to address the significant costs of the Japanese and
German systems of bank-dominated corporate governance, but ignore impor-
tant benefits of the American system of equity-dominated corporate governance
as well. Advocates of bank influence also ignore critical differences between
the monitoring incentives of equity holders and the monitoring incentives of
debt holders. Much of the confusion in the current debate stems from a failure
to appreciate the economics of commercial banking in general and of commer-
cial bank lending in particular. Once the economics and incentives of commer-
cial banking are understood, it becomes clear that greater bank involvement in
the governance of American corporations will not cure the problems created by
the separation of ownership and control. Rather, bank involvement carries with
it an entirely new set of conflicts between the risk-averse claimants who make
loans and the residual claimants who invest risk capital. For this reason,
America is better off trying to repair its own corporate governance system than
it would be adopting an entirely new system, with all its attendant problems.
Part I describes the conflict of interest between a firm's fixed claimants
including banks on the one hand, and a firm's equity claimants on the other.
Understanding this conflict is critical to an analysis of the supposed advantages
that the German and Japanese systems have over the American system. We
show that the current paradigm's core assumption about the role of banks in
corporate governance-namely, that what is good for a nation's banks is also
good for the nation's borrowers-is flawed. Utilizing basic principles of cor-
porate finance, we show that, to the extent that banks control corporate borrow-
ers, they are likely to reduce corporate risktaking below the socially optimal
level.
Part II discusses the German and Japanese corporate g6vernance systems
against the background of the conflict described in Part I. In both systems,
banks exert more influence in corporate decisionmaking than in the United
States. And in both of these systems the banks have used this influence to
reduce risktaking among borrowers and to retard the market for corporate con-
trol. Current wisdom holds that the German and Japanese banking systems
substitute for robust markets for corporate control because such systems reduce
agency costs and improve managerial performance. 10 We argue that the Japa-
nese and German bank-dominated systems of corporate governance actually
8. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 4, at 1928-29.
9. ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNivERSAL BANorNo in TmE UNrrED STATES: WHAT
COULD VE GArN? WHAT COULD WE LOSs? 236 (1994).
10. See notes 32 & 67 infra and accompanying texts.
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prevent the development of robust markets for corporate control in those
countries.
Part III develops a theory of banks' role in the economy in order to analyze
the role of banks in corporate governance. Like all fixed claimants, banks at-
tempt to control moral hazard" and adverse selection12 by borrowers. Unlike
other financial intermediaries, however, which tend to specialize in solving ad-
verse selection problems, banks specialize in controlling moral hazard
problems.
Controlling moral hazard is more critical for banks than for other types of
firms for three reasons. First, borrowers with the most severe moral hazard
problems gravitate disproportionately to banks. Second, banks, unlike other
firms, fund their loan portfolios primarily with checking accounts available to
depositors on demand. The resulting mismatch in the term structure between
assets and liabilities makes them more susceptible to short-term fluctuations in
cash flows. Finally, banks are among the most highly leveraged firms in the
economy, again ensuring their vulnerability to even minor fluctuations in bor-
rowers' cash flows. Therefore, the nature of banks' balance sheets, which are
typically characterized by both high leverage and a mismatch in the term struc-
ture of assets and liabilities, causes banks--even German universal banks that
hold both debt and equity-to be more concerned with risk reduction than with
risktaking in the firms in which they have made investments. In other words,
banks have stronger incentives than other fixed claimants to control the activi-
ties of their borrowers in general and to control moral hazard in particular.
Part IV discusses the efficiency implications of our theory, and the implica-
tions for international comparisons of bank size and profitability. We hypothe-
size that German and Japanese banks will be more profitable than American
banks because they are better able to monitor and control borrowers' moral
hazard. We emphasize, however, that the profitability of these banks not only
prevents firms from undertaking profitable investment opportunities, but also
prevents the future development of robust primary and secondary capital
markets.
Part V explores the implications of our observations for the ongoing debate
about American corporate governance. We argue that simply giving fixed
claimants more power over borrowers will not solve the perceived problems in
American corporate governance. Rather, firm performance can be more effec-
tively enhanced by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control,
thereby improving the voice of American equity holders. Moreover, we argue
that critical features of American law-including environmental law, partner-
ship law, and lender liability rules-limit the ability of banks to monitor and
control the moral hazard of borrowing firms to the same extent as European
rules allow. For these reasons, universal banking offers fewer benefits than is
11. The term "moral hazard" describes the risk lenders face because borrowers have incentives to
increase the riskiness of their projects after obtaining loans. See note 93 infra and accompanying text.
12. The term "adverse selection" describes the risk lenders face because high-risk borrowers, who
apply for loans in disproportionate numbers, are difficult to distinguish from low-risk borrowers. See
note 92 infra and accompanying text.
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commonly perceived, and other, more incremental changes in legal rules offer
greater potential rewards.
Finally, Part VI discusses preconditions for convergence among the corpo-
rate governance systems of the United States, Germany, and Japan. We argue
that convergence is unlikely for several reasons, including resistance by Ger-
man and Japanese banks, the presence of strong institutional investors in the
United States, and path dependence. Because American banks are unlikely to
achieve the same dominance over American firms as German and Japanese
banks have over firms in their own countries, we support proposals to liberalize
the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. We conclude that
liberalization of the banking rules will strengthen the American banking indus-
try without enabling banks to transfer wealth to themselves at the expense of
other shareholders.
I. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN "PLRE" EQurry CLAIMANTS
AND BANKS
Modem corporate finance scholars have formalized the conflict of interest
that exists within the publicly held corporation between the interests of fixed
claimants (such as banks) and the interests of shareholders who hold residual
claims to the firm's earnings.13 When choosing how to allocate assets, firms
that increase risk will transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the residual
claimants. 14 Thus, to the extent that shareholders can influence corporate deci-
sions through their voting power, they can enrich themselves at the expense of
fixed claimants by shiffing assets to risky investments. Similarly, to the extent
that banks and other fixed claimants can influence corporate decisions through
corporate governance structures (or, as in Germany, through their ability to
vote shares owned by others), they can enrich themselves at the expense of
shareholders. The following example illustrates this point.
Suppose that a borrower has assets of $1000 and liabilities of $500. As-
sume the $500 represents the principal and interest due on money borrowed
from banks. This leaves the firm with $500 in shareholders' equity. The firm
must choose between investment strategy A, which has an expected payoff of
$2020 and investment strategy B, which has an expected payoff of $1875.1 s
13. See, e.g., WiL . A. KLEmN & JoHN C. CoFFEE, JPL, Busmsss ORGANIZATION AND FINANcE:
LEGAL Am ECONO.MnC PRnqcPIE.s 225-26 (5th ed. 1993); Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide
and the Proper Role ofInsolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1107 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989); David Millon, Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201. This discussion and the example that follows have been adapted
from our previous article, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring,
and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1153 (1988).
14. KLEIN & CoFFEE, supra note 13, at 257 ("From any starting point, holding the total market
value of the firm and of all securities constant, a decision that shifts investments in such a way as to
increase such risk will result in an increase in the value of the common and a decrease in the value of the
bonds."); Roberta Romano, Financing the Corporation, in FOUNDATONS OF CORPoRATE LAW 123
(Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
15. For investment strategy A, assume that there are five possible outcomes, represented by the
firm's monetary returns in the second column of the table for Strategy A. The probability of each of
these outcomes occurring is shown in the first column. Regardless of the outcome, the firm pays the
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STRATEGY A:
MONETARY RETuRN EXPECTED VALUE
PROBABILITY FIRM BANK COMMON FIRM BANK COMMON
.05 $ 400 $400 $ 0 $ 20 $ 20 $ 0
.20 $1000 $500 $ 500 $ 200 $100 $ 100
.50 $2000 $500 $1500 $1000 $250 $ 750
.20 $3000 $500 $2500 $ 600 $100 $ 500
.05 $4000 $500 $3500 $ 200 $ 25 $ 175
1.00 $2020 $495 $1525
STRATEGY B:
MONETARY RETURN EXPECTED VALUE
PROBABILITY FIRM BANK COMMON FIRM BANK COMMON
.25 $1000 $500 $ 500 $ 250 $125 $ 125
.50 $2000 $500 $1500 $1000 $250 $ 750
.25 $2500 $500 $2000 $ 625 $125 $ 500
1.00 $1875 $500 $1375
As the table for strategy A indicates, there is a 5 percent chance that the
bank will suffer a small loss because, if the investment returns only $400, the
firm will be unable to repay the full $500 loan. In contrast, strategy B poses
absolutely no risk of loss to the bank because, even under the worst possible
scenario, strategy B returns enough to repay in full the principal and interest on
the firm's bank debt.
There are, however, two other important differences between strategies A
and B. First, strategy B is significantly inferior to strategy A from the share-
holders' perspective. Strategy B has an expected return for shareholders of
only $1375, compared with an expected shareholder return of $1525 for strat-
egy A. The demonstrated disparity in expected returns may be explained by the
simple fact that strategy A has both a greater potential upside and a greater
potential downside than strategy B. Because the equity claimants capture all of
the gains on the upside after the bank has been repaid, but share the losses on
the downside with the bank, they obviously prefer the riskier investment.
Strategy B also is inferior from the perspective of society as a whole, since
the expected value of strategy A is $2020, compared with only $1875 for strat-
egy B. Thus, if an economy were to allocate plenary authority over investment
decisions to fixed claimants such as banks, productivity and gross domestic
product would decline to suboptimal levels as the banks steered investments
away from the highest-valued projects and toward lower-valued projects. Thus,
bank first and any residual accrues to the common shareholders. The expected value of each outcome to
the firm, the bank, and the common shareholders is simply the monetary return multiplied by the
probability that it will occur. The sums of the expected values represent the overall expected values of
investment strategy A to the firm, the bank, and the equity holders. All of the investment strategies
discussed in this example follow the same basic outline.
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as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have observed, as residual claimants
under American corporate governance structures, shareholders retain plenary
authority to guide investment decisions because, over a wide range of issues, it
is the shareholders who have the greatest incentive to maximize the value of the
firm.
16
Of course, just as it would be sub-optimal to give plenary authority to the
firm's fixed claimants, so also would it be sub-optimal to give plenary authority
over all investment decisions to the equity claimants: Equity claimants have an
incentive to transfer wealth to themselves by increasing the riskiness of the
firm in which they have invested. Left to their own devices, the shareholders
might select strategy C, which has the following payoff structure:
STRATEGY C:
MONETARY RETURN EXPECTED VALUE
PROBABILrY Frni BANK COMMON FIRM BANK COMMON
.30 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
.50 $1000 $500 $ 500 $ 500 $250 $ 250
.20 $7500 $500 $7000 $1500 $100 $1400
1.00 $2000 $350 $1650
Shiffing to strategy C would increase the expected value of the share-
holder's stake from $1525 under strategy A to $1650, but would reduce the
expected value of the bank's investment from $495 to $350, and the total value
of the firm from $2020 to $2000. As before, the risk of each strategy, as repre-
sented by the probability of particular outcomes, determines the expected value
of each project. For strategy A, the standard deviation from its expected value,
$2020, is relatively small, just $853.17 For strategy B, which from the bank's
perspective is the best investment among the three, the standard deviation from
its expected value of $1875 is even less, just $545.18 For strategy C, however,
the standard deviation from the expected value of $2000 is quite large, $2784.19
For this reason, strategy C is the worst investment among the three from the
16. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395,
403-06 (1983). But see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 290-92 (1980) (describing the market for managerial labor as producing the dominant incen-
tive for maximizing the value of the firm).
17. The standard deviation, which provides a convenient index of portfolio risk, summarizes the
spread of possible expected outcomes for a portfolio. RIcaRiD A. B1.aAr.Y & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CoPoRAraE FINANCE 134 (4th ed. 1991). The standard deviation, represented by a, is the
square root of the variance. The variance is calculated by: a2 = "(x-A)2p(x); where x is the dollar
outcome, p(x) is the probability that the outcome will occur, and g. is the expected value of the invest-
ment strategy. Here, e2 = (400-2020)2(.05) + (1000-2020)2(.20) + (2000-2020)2(.50) + (3000-
2020)2(.20) + (4000-2020)2(.05) = 727,600. The square root of 727,600 is $853, which is the standard
deviation of strategy A.
18. For strategy B, the variance, 2 = (1000_1875)2(.25) + (2000_1875)2(.50) + (2500-1875)2(.25)
= 296,875. The standard deviation of strategy B is $545.
19. For strategy C, the variance, o2 = (0-2000)(.30) + (1000-2000)y(.50) + (7500_2000)2(.20) =
7,750,000. The standard deviation of strategy C is $2784.
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bank's perspective, but the best from the shareholder's perspective. 20 The
shareholders capture the lion's share of the huge upside potential associated
with strategy C, but share the downside loss with the bank.
In a properly functioning capital market, an equilibrium emerges from the
disparate interests of fixed claimants, equity claimants, and indeed, all other
claimants on the firm's cash flows, such as workers, managers, suppliers, and
customers. Rational banks demand compensation in the form of higher interest
payments for the danger that they will loan money to firms with investment
portfolios resembling B, only to have the firm shift its resources toward A or C.
Shareholders, on the other hand, will pay less for stock in firms whose invest-
ment patterns resemble strategy B rather than A or C.
Through bargaining, the parties can improve on any equilibrium that does
not maximize the overall value of the firm. Shareholders, for example, could
agree to pay a higher interest rate in exchange for allowing equity claimants to
pursue riskier projects. Similarly, bondholders could accept a lower interest
rate in exchange for a credible shareholder promise not to shift their invest-
ments towards riskier projects after credit has been extended. Thus, the equi-
librium that emerges in a properly functioning capital market not only protects
both banks and equity holders, but also promotes allocational efficiency (the
efficient allocation of resources within society) because it guarantees that in-
vestments which maximize the overall value of the firm will be pursued.
Two important insights emerge from the preceding discussion that are rele-
vant to the ongoing debate about alternative corporate governance mechanisms.
First, the clear conflict of interest between fixed claimants (including banks)
and equity claimants strongly suggests that banks are not ideal institutions to
monitor corporate performance on behalf of shareholders.21 Second, legal and
structural problems within capital markets raise transaction costs, thereby im-
peding the operation of capital markets and making it more difficult for market
participants to resolve the inherent conflicts between fixed and residual claim-
ants-as well as among other participants in the corporate enterprise. Manag-
ers, for example, tend to be more risk averse than shareholders because the
amount of their compensation is predominantly fixed, aligning their incentives
more closely with fixed claimants than with equity claimants. Managers' in-
centives for risktaking are further reduced because of their investment of
nondiversifiable human capital in their jobs.2 2 The value of this human capital
would depreciate significantly if their firms were to fail. Transaction costs,
particularly the high costs of contracting and the impossibility of predicting the
future with certainty, make it is impossible to design executive compensation
20. The degree of outcome variance is not, strictly, the basis for a fixed claimant's aversion to a
particular investment scheme. While outcome variance may indicate the likelihood of the borrower's
ability to meet fixed claims, it is not necessarily detem-inative. A fixed claimant is less concerned about
upside potential than with downside risk-the probability of an outcome that prevents the borrower
from meeting fixed claims. A large outcome variance may result from a substantial disparity between
upside and downside potential, or simply from a substantial downside risk.
21. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 1444-47 (suggesting that corporate law exists
because it minimizes transaction costs to competing interest groups within the corporation).
22. KLEiN & CoPPSE, supra note 13, at 266-67.
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contracts that perfectly align the interests of managers with the interests of
shareholders.23 The deviation of managerial risk preferences from shareholder
preferences often results in a suboptimal level of risktaking by firms.24
Legal rules and institutions can exacerbate these inefficiencies. Rules that
artificially restrict the market for corporate control, or that artificially increase
the bargaining power of one group of claimants (e.g., by guaranteeing them
places on corporate boards of directors), can prevent investing parties from
reaching a wealth maximizing bargaining equilibrium and achieving alloca-
tional efficiency.
II. ROMANTICIZING THE ROLE OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE BANKS
The critical distinction between the American model and the German and
Japanese models of corporate governance is easily summarized. In Germany
and Japan, large block shareholders take an active management role to mitigate
managerial shirking and misconduct.25 By contrast, the American structure of
corporate governance largely focuses power in management, particularly in the
chief executive officer.2 6 For this reason, American shareholders are relatively
powerless to affect management decisions; they are too disaggregated to moni-
tor management's activities, much less to galvanize into effective political co-
alitions to oppose these activities.
A. The Japanese Main Banking System
Scholars often romanticize the Japanese main bank system. They argue that
Japanese main banks effectively monitor their debtors, helping to prevent busi-
ness failure and substituting for a robust corporate control market.27 The Japa-
nese system of corporate governance is characterized by a complex network of
inter-corporate equity holdings, with Japanese banks at the center of the net-
work.2 8 This pattern of cross-holdings makes hostile takeovers virtually un-
known in Japan. As a large number of commentators have observed, bank
oversight replaces the market for corporate control in Japan.2 9 In the United
23. Id.
24. See Irwin Friend & Larry H. P. Lang, An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-
Interest on Corporate Capital Structure, 43 J. FN. 271 (1988). Friend and Lang find that high levels of
debt (and hence greater risk) in corporate capital structures correspond to low levels of managerial stock
ownership. Id. at 280. Firms where principal stockholders were not managers tend to assume higher
risk levels. Id.
25. See Roe, supra note 4, at 1936-48 (describing the influence of large block shareholders in
Japanese and German corporations).
26. Id. at 1928-30. Historically, this concentration of power in American management occurred
because the rise of large-scale production capabilities in the late 19th century demanded huge inputs of
capital, which could only be supplied by large numbers of disaggregated investors. Id. at 1933.
27. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 879 (1993) (noting that Ameri-
can commentators were drawn to the Japanese main bank system as a "monitoring paragon").
28. RANDALL MORCK & MASAO NAKAmuRA, BANKS Am CORPORAa CONrROL IN JAPAN 4-5
(Institute for Financial Research, Faculty of Business, University of Alberta, Working Paper No. 6-92,
rev. July 26, 1993).
29. See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick &Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An
Introductory Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: ITS RELEVANCE FOR DEVELOPING AND
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States, the market for corporate control reduces managerial inefficiency and
restrains managerial self-interest. A robust corporate control market spurs hos-
tile takeovers; new owners replace inefficient management teams. 30 Strong ev-
idence indicates that hostile takeovers discipline managers and improve
corporate performance. 31
Recent empirical work shows that the Japanese main bank system serves as
a quasi-substitute for the corporate control market. In a study of large Japanese
firms in the 1980s, Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura found that:
poor stock market performance in large non-financial firms leads to an in-
creased probability that a bank executive is named to the board of directors the
subsequent year. The appointment of a new bank representative to a board is
regarded as important by Japanese financial analysts and by the financial press.
It is thought to indicate increased bank attention to the company. We also find
that liquidity problems are a strong predictor of intervention. Bank interven-
tion is followed by a quick return to industry normal cash flow and liquidity
levels. Sales growth and especially employment growth remain low for several
years, but eventually recover to industry average levels. This recovery is ac-
companied by improved stock market performance. Because of the role banks
play in the management of troubled firms, we suggest that a hierarchy based on
bank oversight to some extent replaces the market for corporate control in
Japan.32
Three critical features of Japanese corporate governance deserve special
emphasis. First, large Japanese firms generally own blocks of shares in other
Japanese firms,33 which they are unwilling to sell except in unusual circum-
stances. 34 Second, Japanese banks, unlike American banks,35 can hold and
TRANSFORMING ECONOMIES 3 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., 1994) (describing the main bank
system as a system of corporate financing and governance in which capital market participants and
regulators expect main banks to monitor firms and intervene when things go wrong); Gilson & Roe,
supra note 27, at 879-81; Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in
Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECoN. 67, 70-71 (1990); STEVEN N.
KAPLAN & BERNADETTE A. MINTON, 'OuTsmE' INTERVENTION IN JAPANESE COMPANIES: ITS DETrauRM-
NANTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 3-4 (National Bureau of Economic Research working
Paper No. 4276, Feb. 1993); Stephen D. Prowse, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, 47 J.
FYN. 1121, 1127 (1992); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in
Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEaAV. & ORG. 399, 407-09 (1989).
30. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110, 112-
13 (1965) (describing the process of replacing inefficient management).
31. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scien-
tific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-30 (1983) (stating that hostile takeovers limit managerial ineffi-
ciency); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate
Control, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 842, 851-52 (1989) (studying 454 of the 1980 Fortune 500 firms and
finding that hostile takeovers constitute the main force behind the removal of unresponsive firm manag-
ers in poorly performing industries).
32. MORCK & NAKAMURA, supra note 28, at 3.
33. Gilson & Roe, supra note 27, at 882-83.
34. MORCK & NAKAMURA, supra note 28, at 4; See also Harald Baum & Ulrike Schaede, Institu-
tional Investors and Corporate Governance in Japanese Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 609, 629-30 (Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt eds.,
1993) (noting that 75% of Japanese stock is held by "relationship-oriented" investors and that 83.5% of
Nikkei firms believed that 50% or more of their equity was held by "stable shareholders").
35. Under U.S. law, bank holding companies, but not banks, can own up to 5% of the stock in a
firm that is engaged in activities unrelated to banking, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994), but the investment
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vote substantial (up to 5 percent) blocks of stock in any industrial firm.36 Fi-
nally, and of utmost importance, the pattern of cross-holdings prevalent in Ja-
pan represents a "deliberate response by [Japanese] managers ... to a series of
hostile raids in the early post-war years."
'37
After World War II, the occupation forces broke up the large corporate
groups (zaibatsu) controlled by leading Japanese families and financed by large
universal banks. The occupation forces effected the diffusion of ownership by
compelling the families to sell their cross-holdings in each other's shares.38 By
1950, cross-holdings of shares was virtually eliminated. 39 But when the U.S.
occupation ended, cross-holdings quickly re-emerged, as managers feared that
the depressed prices of their shares would spur hostile takeovers.40 In the mid-
1960s, these new cross-holding networks, called keiretsu, gained in strength as
depressed stock prices led to a threat of hostile takeovers, and the large banks
(Fuji, Sanwa and Daiichi-Kangyo) "began major efforts to increase cross-hold-
ing among firms associated with them, again with the explicit aim of blocking
potential hostile takeovers." 41 This pattern repeated itself in the 1970s.42
In keiretsu, member firms own less than 2 percent of the stock in other
member firms. Because each member of a keiretsu owns about 2 percent of
every other firm in the group, however, between 30 percent and 90 percent of
the stock in each firm will be owned by other keiretsu members.43 At the
center of the keiretsu are the banks, which have seats on corporate boards and
can exert pressure on corporate management, particularly when cash flows be-
come unstable.44
Management gains from the Japanese pattern of bank domination and cross-
ownership, because the system allows incumbent management to insulate itself
from takeovers and thus avoid the strict discipline imposed by the takeover
market. As Morck and Nakamura astutely observe, "the pattern of cross hold-
ings among Japanese keiretsu firms is, to a large extent, a deliberate anti-take-
over defense system. It serves the same purpose as poison pills, greenmail and
shark repellents do in U.S. firms."'4 5
At first glance, the gains to banks from the keiretsu system appear less
evident. But embedded in the cross-holdings is a stable system of equity own-
ership that eliminates the threat of hostile takeovers which might increase the
target firm's leverage and transfer wealth from the fixed claimants (the banks)
must be passive. But see notes 177-185, infra and accompanying text (discussing proposals to reduce
the legal barriers facing American banking organizations).
36. MoRcK & NAmuRA, supra note 28, at 4.




41. Id. at 7.
42. Id.
43. Watching the Boss: A Survey of Corporate Governance 8, in EcoNorNsT, Jan. 29, 1994, at 58
[hereinafter Corporate Governance Survey].
44. MoicK & NAAmup-A, supra note 28, at 28-29.
45. Id. at 7.
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to the equity claimants. 46 In addition, banks may use their central roles in
Japanese keiretsu to influence the degree of internal risktaking by firms. Con-
sistent with this analysis, Morck and Nakamura find that highly leveraged firms
are more likely to have bank representatives appointed to their boards than
other firms. 47 This suggests that banks step in to control risk that might benefit
shareholders at the banks' expense.
In sum, over a wide range of corporate governance issues, banks align
themselves with the interests of incumbent management and oppose the inter-
ests of shareholders. Because both managers and banks have fixed claims on
their firms' cash flows, they care far less about maximizing their firms' poten-
tial upside performance than about minimizing potential downside perform-
ance. Thus, the keiretsu relationship benefits both managers and banks because
the relationship reduces the uncertainty associated with the managers' human
capital investment and the banks' fixed capital investment. But this implicit
contract between banks and the management of publicly held borrowers harms
outside shareholders, who would capture all the marginal gains from profitable,
but uncertain, investments. For this reason, "lilt is unclear to what extent pub-
lic shareholders benefit from bank intervention. '48 In fact, empirical studies
find no discernible overall effect on share prices following bank intervention.
49
When corporations join a keiretsu, they limit their ability to obtain funding
from outside banks for two primary reasons. First, outside lenders know that
equity cross-holdings will induce keiretsu firms to elect strategies that benefit
the keiretsu and not the outside lenders.50 Second, once a borrower associates
with the main bank within a keiretsu, the information effects of switching banks
will impede the borrower's ability to choose a new source of funding 51 During
the course of developing a client-bank relationship, banks acquire specialized
information about their clients, including detailed-and often confidential-
information about their clients' businesses, localized knowledge about such
things as how well their individual clients deal with business problems, and
information about whether particular clients are trustworthy. Because this in-
formation must be built up over a long period of time through a pattern of
46. See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. EcoN. Paremp. 21, 31
(1988) (stating that hostile takeovers and takeover defenses are funded primarily with debt). The value
of debt issued before a takeover reflects the degree of business risk and leverage. Increased leverage
(i.e., more debt) results in increased risk to preexisting debt holders. This increased risk causes debt
values to decline and equity values to appreciate. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 261,281-88 (1958).
47. MORCK & N x~muRA, supra note 28, at 21.
48. Id. at 34.
49. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
50. The position of the keiretsu's main bank as de facto insurer for other creditors of keiretsu
firms further enhances participant firms' incentive to favor other keiretsu firms over outside lenders.
MoRcK & NAKAmuRA, supra note 28, at 9-10; Sheard, supra note 29, at 407. Although a keiretsu firm
must also consider the interests of its creditors outside the keiretsu, it will often make marginal decisions
in favor of the interests of other keiretsu firms and lenders. See Baum & Schaede, supra note 34, at 642.
51. Monitoring systems in Japanese capital markets are generally underdeveloped, especially
when compared to the quality and variety of bond and credit-rating institutions-as well as security
analysis agencies-in the United States. Sheard, supra note 29, at 403. Because of their close, informa-
tion-sharing relationship with firms, main banks replace other market monitoring mechanisms. Id.
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repeat dealings, the negative market-signaling effect of main bank disassocia-
tion heightens the importance of the relationship.52 Customers, suppliers, and
investors may infer that a client is switching banks because the client is exper-
iencing credit problems.5 3 Because it is expensive to correct this signal, even if
the firm's credit is excellent, the firm will avoid main bank disassociation.
Most major Japanese firms are affiliated with main banks.54 Managers of
these firms sacrifice control and flexibility for the safety and security of a main
bank relationship. Over time, Japanese firms become extraordinarily depen-
dent on their banking relationships, relying more heavily on bank debt than
American firms. Japanese firms borrow $5.33 from banks for every dollar they
raise in capital markets, while American firms borrow only $0.85 from banks
for every dollar they raise in capital markets. 55
This borrowing pattern does not reflect the relative profitability of main
bank borrowing. In fact, main banks charge their client firms above-market
interest rates, 56 and the premium over market appears to increase the more the
firm becomes dependent upon financing from banks within the keiretsu.57 Pro-
fessor Masahiko Aoki describes the high debt costs as an" 'agency fee' paid by
individual stockholders to the bank for [the] service of [monitoring manage-
ment]." s58 But in light of the embedded conflicts between bank interests and
shareholder interests, it is more likely that firms pay these excess fees in ex-
change for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hos-
tile takeovers, and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
If banks were acting to maximize equity values in the firms in which they
invested, then they would intervene to deter poor stock price performance.
Some evidence supports this contention.59 Nevertheless, Japanese banks more
often interfere in management affairs in response to cash flow and liquidity
problems (which are of more concern to banks than the return to equity claim-
52. The information costs that follow disassociation of long-term relationships are by no means
limited to Japanese client-bank relationships. In general, moral hazard and adverse selection issues are
ameliorated by long-term client-bank relationships. See Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition
in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828, 829 (1989).
53. In addition to indicating significant problems within the firm, disassociation removes the firm
from the monitoring function of the main bank.
54. In 1982, over 90% of the nonfinancial firms listed on the Japanese Stock Exchange were
affiliated with a main bank. Sheard, supra note 29, at 401.
55. J. MARK RAMS=ER, ExPLicr REASONS FOR IMia'ucir CoNRACTS: TnE LErAL Loo1rc TO THE
JAPANESE MAIN BANK SvsrM 3 (Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics No. 17, 2d ser., Aug.
1993). Generally, less than half of a Japanese firm's borrowed funds come directly from a main bank.
See Tosinmito Hoirucrn, THE EFFECT OF FIRm STATus ON BANKiNG RELATiONsrnPs AND LOAN SYrNi-
CATION 20-21, 33 (UniversitA di Siena, Quademi del Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Apr. 1994).
The vast majority of loans to Japanese finns are arranged through loan syndicates which are founded
upon the long-term relationship between the firm and its main bank. Id. at 20.
56. MoRcK & NA. uRA, supra note 28, at 9 (citing RicHARD E. CAVES & MASU UEKusA,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION iN JAPAN (1976)).
57. Id. Keiretsu firms also tend to have more leverage than unaffiliated Japanese firms, although
there are few non-keiretsu firms. Id. This suggests that main banks 'encourage' their keiretsu affiliates
to borrow more.
58. MASAmaO AoKi, INFO RmATION, INCENTrVs, AND BARGAINro iN THE JAPANEsE ECONOMY
148 (1988).
59. See MORCK & NAKAMRUPA, supra note 28, at 30 (concluding that poor cash flows and liquidity
problems, as well as poor stock performance, often lead to bank intervention).
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ants) than to poor stock performance.60 This strongly suggests that banks do
not act altruistically to protect the interests of shareholders, but rather to protect
their own interests as fixed claimants. 61 In fact, contrary to Aoki's assertions,
the available evidence indicates that shareholders do not benefit from bank in-
volvement in distressed firms. Although bank involvement improves cash
flows and profitability, it has no discernible effect on share prices.62 This sug-
gests that managers and bankers, rather than shareholders, consume the value
added by banks.63
Steven Kaplan and Bernadette Minton also examined the appointment of
outside directors to the boards of large nonfinancial Japanese corporations.64
Kaplan and Minton observe that outside appointments in the United States are
less sensitive to poor corporate performance than in Japan. 65 Consistent with
our view, Japanese banks make more frequent appointments to the boards of
keiretsu firms with which they have a significant lending relationship. 66 How-
ever, Kaplan and Minton also find that the appointment of outsiders to Japanese
corporate boards is associated with an increase in management turnover. This
finding may seem inconsistent with our view that Japanese banks and incum-
bent management act together to advance the interests of fixed claimants.
Kaplan and Minton conclude that their results are
consistent with an important monitoring and disciplining role for banks, corpo-
rate shareholders, and corporate groups in Japan. The results are also consis-
tent with the view that the relationship-oriented system of corporate
governance in Japan substitutes for the more market-oriented system in the
U.S. Banks, corporate shareholders, and corporate groups appear to play a role
that is similar to that of takeovers and proxy fights in the U.S.6 7
While Kaplan and Minton persuasively show that Japanese banks monitor
and discipline the management of the firms with which they have relationships,
60. Id. at 29. Regression analysis reveals that bank intervention is 100% more likely when liquid-
ity and cash flows are very low relative to an industry norm than when stock performance is similarly
poor. Id.
61. While Japan's banking industry is in financial crisis following the burst of Japan's real estate
bubble in 1990, there is no indication that this crisis will provide the impetus for change in banks'
interests or investment preferences. Because the losses to Japanese banks followed relatively risky loans
in the real estate and financial sectors, keiretsu banks may be more concerned with advancing their
interests as fixed claimants and avoiding additional risk in the relatively safe corporate sector. See
generally Jean-Michel Paul, Japan's Banking Crisis Continues, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1995, at A14
(describing the aftermath of Japanese banks' hazardous investment strategy during the 1980s).
62. Following Japanese bank intervention, a firm's liquidity sharply increases, and cash flows
return relatively quickly to normal levels. MORCK & NAKA MRA, supra note 28, at 36-37. By compari-
son, although stock return increases 6.4% on average immediately after intervention, it declines 6.3% in
the year following intervention. Thus, with regard to stock performance, bank intervention is a near-
complete wash for equity holders. Id. at 34-35.
63. The astonishingly high entertainment expenses incurred by firms subjected to bank interven-
tion further supports this conclusion. In 1991, Japanese corporate entertainment expenses amounted to
Y6.14 trillion ($62 billion). Id. at 34. In the years immediately following intervention, firm entertain-
ment expenses increased significantly more than 100%. Id. at 57.
64. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards:
Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. EcoN. 225 (1994).
65. Id. at 239-42.
66. Id. at 243.
67. Id. at 257.
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their analysis fails to show that Japanese banks monitor and discipline the same
conduct that the American market for corporate control regulates. In particular,
Kaplan and Minton's analysis fails to explain why banks, as fixed claimants,
have the same incentive to maximize firm value as equity claimants. Thus, we
find their results consistent with our view that Japanese banks discipline and
control management teams that endanger the value of the banks' fixed claims.
The proposition that Japanese banks have the same preferences as outside eq-
uity holders or corporate raiders in the United States is simply without support.
Neither the available evidence nor common sense supports the theory that
Japanese main banks altruistically undertake costly monitoring for the principal
benefit of shareholders. Rather, the evidence suggests that Japanese banks in-
tervene to protect their own interests as fixed claimants. Because banks are
highly leveraged, and demand deposits dominate their balance sheets, banks
have a strong incentive to ensure that cash flows from borrowers remain ex-
tremely stable. Thus, while Japanese banks hold equity positions in firms to
which they loan money, their fixed interests dominate their equity interests.
B. German Universal Banks
German universal banks play an even greater role in corporate governance
than their Japanese counterparts. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that "the
universal bank sits at the epicenter of German corporate governance. '68 As
with the Japanese main bank system, scholars tend to romanticize the character-
istics and consequences of German corporate governance.69 Commentators ar-
gue that, in sharp contrast to American banks, German banks have "the
position, information, and power to effectively monitor the activity of manage-
ment and, when necessary, to discipline management. ' 70 As a result, bank in-
volvement supposedly improves the profitability of firms. 71
The German Aktiengesellschaft ("AG") is the corporate organizational form
most comparable to the American publicly held corporation. 72 Unlike the
American corporation, however, the AG features a two-tier board structure,
containing both a management and executive committee (vorstand), and a su-
pervisory board of directors (Aufsichtsrat).73 The supervisory board appoints
the vorstand, but its other powers are limited: "The supervisory board cannot,
even by purported delegation, take any steps in the actual management" of the
68. Gilson & Kraaknan, supra note ], at 988.
69. See, e.g., John Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of
West German Banks, 95 EcON. J., Mar. 1985, at 118, 130 (finding a "significant, positive relationship
between the degree of bank involvement" in a firm and its financial performance). But see Roberta
Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J.
2021, 2021 (1993) (noting that legal and institutional differences among countries make it difficult to
conclude that one country's corporate governance system is superior to another's).
70. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 988.
71. Cable, supra note 69, at 121.
72. See NORBERT HoRN, HEiN KOTZ & HANs G. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AN CoMMERCIAL
LAw: AN INTRODuCriON 257-71 Crony Weir trans., 1982) (describing the legal structure of AG's in
Germany).
73. lId at 258-59.
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firm, 74 but it does screen management's investment plans, and it can veto plans
of which it disapproves. 75 One commentator has analogized the role of the
supervisory board to that of the U.S. Senate in advising and consenting to the
President's appointments and to treaty agreements. 76
The most striking aspect of the AGs is that fixed claimants, banks and em-
ployees, almost completely dominate the supervisory boards of these firms.
Because German banks are heavily represented on the supervisory boards,77
and the boards of companies with more than 2000 employees must have em-
ployee representation equal to that of the shareholders78 the combined power of
the fixed claimants dominates the board.
German banks, like Japanese banks, own only a modest share of firms to
which they lend money, but they exercise a degree of control significantly
greater than their proportionate holdings. Though banks account for only about
6 percent of large share stakes in German firms,7 9 they tend to exert effective
control over a majority of the shares voted in annual meetings.80 For example,
as of 1988 Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank directly owned 28.2 percent and
1.6 percent, respectively, of Daimler-Benz's outstanding shares.81 By compari-
son, in 1986 these banks held voting rights in Daimler-Benz of 41.8 percent
and 18.78 percent respectively.82
The disparity between the small equity positions and the large voting power
of German banks is attributable to a combination of three factors. First, Ger-
man banks vote bearer shares that they hold as custodians for small share-
holder-clients of the banks' brokerage operations. These individual investors
deposit their shares with banks, and the banks vote by proxy at shareholders'
meetings. 83 Second, German companies frequently pass resolutions capping
74. Id. at 260.
75. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis of the International Evi-
dence 11 (Nov. 19, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
76. See Roe, supra note 4, at 1942.
77. In 1988, German bank representatives sat on the supervisory boards of 96 of the 100 largest
German firms. Roe, supra note 4, at 1939. Bank representatives chaired 14 of those boards. Id.
78. M.C. OruvaR, THE PRIVATE CoMPANY IN GERMNY 12 (1986); Friedrich Kfibler, Institutional
Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BRooK. L. REv. 97, 98 (1991).
79. Those German Banks and their Industrial Treasuries, EcoNomsr, Jan. 21, 1995, at 71 (stating
that 85% of Germany's 171 largest nonfinancial finns have single shareholders who ovm more than
25% of the voting stock; only 6% of these large blocs are ovmed by banks). Ten percent of the total
market capitalization is owned directly by banks. Michael Hauck, The Equity Market in Germany and
Its Dependency on the System of Old Age Provisions, in INsTrrrTONAL INvamos AND ConoRATE
GovWRNAwCE, supra note 34, at 555, 561.
80. Three banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank) controlled an average of 45% of
the voting stock in 32 of the 100 largest AGs in 1986. A combination of eight banks control over 80%
of the voting stock. Amo Gottschalk, Der Stimmrechtseinflufi der Banken in den Aktiondrsversam-
mlungen der Gro/3unternehmen, in 5 WSI MrTEiLuNGEN 294, 298, tbl. 3 (1988).
81. Roe, supra note 4, at 1998.
82. Id. at 1938; Gottschalk, supra note 80, at 298, tbl. 3.
83. When German investors deposit their stock certificates, the custodian bank obtains a revocable
proxy authorization from the owner, allowing the bank to vote the stock by "depositary voting right"
(Depotstimmrecht). The proxy authorization has a duration of 15 months. AKTENGESETZ [AktG] § 135
(1995) (German Corporate Code). Although depository shareholders do have the right to direct their
vote, only about 2-3% do so. MICHAEL PuRRucKER, BAKEN IN DER KARTELLRECrrcHEN FusIoN-
SKoNTROLLE 96 (1983).
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the voting rights of any single shareholder at 5 percent to 15 percent of total
votes, regardless of the size of its shareholding.8 4 Because such restrictions do
not apply to banks voting shares by proxy, these rules further increase the vot-
ing power of the universal banks.85 Finally, German banks augment their vot-
ing rights by voting the shares owned by mutual funds they operate.
86
Despite their substantial voting power, German banks' economic stake in
AGs is primarily the result of corporate lending. Like Japanese firms, German
firms obtain most of their external financing from bank borrowing rather than
capital markets.87 Bank borrowing, primarily in the form of long-term loans,
comprises 20 percent of the external financing for German companies.88 Ger-
man firms borrow $4.20 from banks for every dollar they obtain from capital
markets, whereas American firms borrow $0.85 for every dollar they raise in
the capital markets.89
The German bank's dual role as creditor and shareholder creates a signifi-
cant conflict of interest. Banks have an economic incentive to vote against
risktaking at firms to which they have lent money. However, from the perspec-
tive of shareholders on whose behalf the banks vote, banks reduce aggregate
risktaking to a suboptimal level and thereby transfer wealth from shareholders
to themselves. Furthermore, labor interests on the supervisory board are un-
likely to oppose banks' efforts to reduce aggregate risktaking because they, too,
are fixed claimants, their interests are aligned with those of the bank.
The above description of German corporate governance illustrates that the
United States is not the only country to separate corporate ownership and con-
trol. As with small U.S. shareholders, individual German shareholders lack
"the information, skill, and incentive to monitor managers." 90 The difference
appears to be that in America the managers wield the decisive power, while in
Germany management shares this power with the banks and labor.
In addition, German banks, like Japanese banks, protect incumbent manage-
ment by effectively eliminating the market for corporate control. The total
number of takeovers in Germany during the 1980s was less than one-half of
that in the U.K., and there have only been four recorded cases of hostile take-
overs in Germany since World War II.91
84. Franks & Mayer, supra note 75, at 8. The corporate charter (Satzung) can be modified by a
vote of three-quarters of the shares to limit the voting power of large-block shareholders. AktG § 179
(1995). See Judgment of Dec. 19, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], 70 Entscheidungen des Bundesger-
ichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 117, 121 (German Supreme Court).
85. Gottschalk, supra note 80, at 294-96.
86. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 987-88 (noting that German banks' voting control de-
rives from their direct holdings, the proxies they exercise, and their control of mutual funds).
87. The German stock market capitalization is about 25% of the German GDP, while U.S. stock
market capitalization is close to 65% of the U.S. GDP. See Corporate Governance Survey, supra note
43, at 6.
88. Cable, supra note 69, at 119.
89. RAisEYER, supra note 55, at 3.
90. Roe, supra note 4, at 1933.
91. Franks & Mayer, supra note 75, at 8; see also Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43,
at 13 ("There is little prospect of hostile bids coming to ... Germany.").
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III. COMMERCIAL BANKS AS FIXED CLAIMANTS: TH MoRAL
HAzARD PROBLEM
It should now be clear that the bank-centered corporate governance struc-
tures of Germany and Japan may be more beneficial to commercial banks and
to incumbent management than to equity claimants. In this section, we elabo-
rate this argument by examining banks' incentives and transaction costs when
making loans to firms. We conclude by demonstrating that although German
and Japanese banks are better able to monitor and control moral hazard than
American banks, excessive risk-avoidance may effectively prevent the develop-
ment of robust primary and secondary capital markets.
The economic models of banking recognize that banks face both "adverse
selection" and "moral hazard" problems when evaluating the creditworthiness
of potential borrowers. In the context of banking, "adverse selection" describes
the danger that bad borrowers will seek loans from banks in disproportionate
numbers.92 This danger exists because bad borrowers have better information
regarding their ability to repay loans than their bankers do. Bankers often can-
not distinguish between bad borrowers and good borrowers, as all borrowers try
to convince lenders that they are good credit risks. Thus, banks conduct costly
investigations of potential borrowers to reduce adverse selection costs.
While adverse selection arises at the time a borrower initially applies for a
loan, moral hazard problems occur after a bank has extended credit.93 "Moral
hazard" refers to the problem that arises when outside equity interests control
corporate borrowers' day-to-day operations. Equity investors have an incentive
to increase the riskiness of their firms' investments after a bank has extended
credit.94 As residual claimants, shareholders will receive all the benefits from
excess returns associated with these riskier investments, but share any conse-
quent losses with the bank. Thus, borrowers have a strong incentive to increase
the riskiness of their firms' projects in order to transfer wealth from the banks
to themselves. 95 Banks can mitigate moral hazard by consistently monitoring
borrowers. Repeat dealing further mitigates moral hazard because repeat bor-
rowers realize that banks may terminate credit lines and other lending arrange-
ments upon breach of express or implied conditions in the loan agreements.
92. In the insurance context, by comparison, "adverse selection" results when bad risks purchase
insurance because it is underpriced in their view, but good risks do not purchase insurance because it is
overpriced from their perspective. ROBERT CoOTFR & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 66-67
(1988).
93. See id. at 65-66 (describing moral hazard problems in the insurance context where the in-
sured's behavior changes after the purchase).
94. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
95. Because American lenders are relatively unable to monitor borrowers' use of the funds, how-
ever, they may charge borrowers an inadequate risk premium, creating an inappropriately low capital
cost on borrowers' risktaking. By analogy to the relationship between banks and depositors, where the
banks are borrowers and depositors are lenders, banks may increase risk without paying higher rates if
depositors are poor monitors. George C. Kaufman, The Truth About Bank Runs, in THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES REVOLUTION: POLICY DmECnoNs FOR THE FrnuE 9, 23-26 (Catherine England & Thomas
Huertas eds., 1988) (explaining that depositors choose banks less cautiously when their deposits are
insured, allowing banks to increase risk without increasing payments to depositors).
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The evaluation process that a firm must undergo before it obtains funds in
the capital markets96 is virtually identical to the evaluation process that a firm
undergoes when it applies for a bank loan. The investment banker's scrutiny of
the potential issuer, like the commercial loan officer's scrutiny of the potential
borrower, is designed to reduce the adverse selection problem that confronts
investment bankers and commercial bankers alike. Thus, adverse selection
does not explain how the borrower will choose between the debt market and the
commercial loan market because neither investment bankers nor commercial
lenders have a comparative advantage in solving this problem. Likewise, both
have an economic incentive to conduct an extensive evaluation.
Bank lenders, however, do have a comparative advantage over investment
bankers in dealing with the moral hazard problem because of the relative lack
of a free rider problem in commercial lending. When securities are distributed
in a public offering, a shareholder's incentive to monitor the issuer's activities
dissipates in direct proportion to the breadth of the distribution. No single in-
vestor has sufficient incentive to monitor the activities of the issuer because the
monitoring shareholder must share the gains of oversight with all investors,
while bearing all the costs. Because a single bank does not face this free rider
problem, its monitoring will be more intense than that of multiple investors in a
public offering.
This analysis explains why some firms rely more heavily on the bank lend-
ing for funds than others. Borrowers presenting more acute moral hazard
problems will find it relatively more costly to enter the securities market than
the commercial loan market because capital market participants will anticipate
the free rider problem and demand additional compensation for accepting the
associated risk.97 Consequently, firms with acute moral hazard problems will
borrow from banks rather than capital market investors. Suppose, for example,
that two firms are in need of funding. The first firm's assets cannot be
redeployed from their current investment configuration without bankrupting the
firm, but the second firm can easily redeploy its assets. The first firm is likely
to obtain relatively more of its funding from the securities markets,98 while the
second is likely to seek the bulk of its funding from banks or finance
companies.
96. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77 (1994)), provides that any person acquiring a security whose registration statement contains
"an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact" may sue, among others, every
underwriter of the security for damages. § 77k(a). To avoid liability, the underwriter must show that
"he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe" that the registra-
tion statement did not contain an untrue statement or omission. § 77k(b)(3)(A). The investigation and
review of the registration statement prompted by these sections is known as "due diligence."
97. For example, the high fixed costs of public offerings preclude many smaller firms from enter-
ing the public markets for debt and equity. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsoles-
cence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CAvanozo L. REv. 909, 925
(1994) (arguing that the rules of capital formation and allocation increase the cost of raising capital).
98. This is a generalization, absent considerations of leverage and optimal capital structure.
Broadly, this assertion is correct, at least for medium and large firms, because their marginal fixed costs
of an equity issue will be less than the marginal costs associated with borrowing.
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Generally, when information about assets is readily available, those assets
will be securitized.99 Conceptually, the credit risks posed by firms occupy
points on "a continuum, with 'information-problematic' borrowers at one end,
and borrowers with few information problems at the other."100 Borrowers with
few information problems will issue publicly traded securities (along with com-
mercial paper and medium term notes) and forego bank borrowing.10 1 Infor-
mation-problematic borrowers, however, must obtain financing from banks or
finance companies because capital market participants will be unwilling to ex-
tend credit to issuers about whom they have insufficient information. 0 2
While commercial lenders have no ex ante advantage over other financial
intermediaries in terms of obtaining information about borrowers, 103 they have
an ex post advantage in their ability to monitor and control borrowers after the
lending decision has been made. This ability to control borrowers and thereby
reduce moral hazard is the source of commercial lenders' advantage over the
capital markets.
Our account differs from conventional analysis in two ways. First, we dis-
tinguish between information that relates to the borrower ex ante (i.e. before the
decision to extend credit is made) and information about the borrower ex post
(i.e. after the decision to extend credit has been made). It is a lender's ability to
gain access to information ex post that distinguishes lending from securitiza-
tion. Second, we stress that having few information problems is a necessary,
but insufficient, condition for borrowers to enter the capital markets. Potential
borrowers also must make a credible commitment that the nature of the infor-
mation will not change expost. For this to happen, the lender will find it neces-
sary to retain significant control or potential control over the borrower expost.
This degree of control differentiates a typical lending relationship from a secur-
ities offering.
99. Alan Greenspan, Statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate (Dec. 1, 1987), 74 FED. RsERv BULL. 91, 94 (1988) (discussing advancing technology that
provides investors with access to monitoring information that only depository intermediaries previously
possessed); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The Politicization of a
Social Problem, 45 STAN. L. Ray. 289, 296-97 (1992) (asserting that information costs decline with
advancing technology, allowing assets about which information is scarce to be securitized).
100. Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 296 (arguing that securitization has caused banks to take
on a greater portion of risky, information-problematic credit risks, resulting in an increasingly risky
commercial banking industry); see generally ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKs Do? 8-10 (1987)
(describing financial intermediaries' traditional role of assuming the risk of mismatched savers and
investors).
101. Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 296; see also Douglas W. Diamond, Debt Maturity Struc-
ture and Liquidity Risk, 106 Q. J. EcoN. 709,709 (1991) (developing a model to explain why firms with
high credit ratings issue short-term debt while firms with low credit ratings issue long-term bonds or
borrow from financial intermediaries).
102. Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 296. As informational distinctions blur, they lose rele-
vance to the structure of firm financing. The recent growth in the structured finance industry, for exam-
ple, allows a firm with aggregate information problems to separate assets which are not information-
problematic from those which are. Investors then look only to the separated assets, not the information-
problematic firm, for payment. See STvEN L. ScHwAXcz, STRUCTURED FinANcF: A GUIDE TO THE
FtrDAImErrAt.s OF AssET SEcuarnuATON 1-3 (1990) (potential buyers of the securities look to the cash
flow from the purchased receivables, and not to the credit of the selling company).
103. See Greenspan, supra note 99, at 93-94.
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Combining the deposit-taking function and the lending function within a
single firm enables banks to obtain reliable information about the investment
decisions of corporate borrowers. 104 Deposit taking provides banks with an
important source of information about borrowers because banks generally make
loans to clients who maintain other accounts with the bank. The information
that banks derive from monitoring commercial customers' checking accounts,
for example, gives them a significant information advantage over other finan-
cial intermediaries.10 5 Under this "checking account hypothesis," banks are
good monitors of borrowers because of their exclusive access to current infor-
mation concerning the ongoing financial condition of borrowers.'
0 6
Unfortunately for commercial banks, technological advances have reduced
the costs of recording, transmitting and processing customer information. 10 7 In
the United States, these advances have made it possible for nonbank lenders
such as commercial finance companies to obtain the information they need
about borrowers without offering checking accounts. 108 Computer-based retail
information services, for example, provide lenders with detailed data about the
cash flows and inventories of borrowers. 10 9 Such information is often more
current than that available from checking account records. 10
To successfully avoid the costs of moral hazard, banks must have not only
information about their borrowers, but also the ability to use this information to
control their borrowers. Lenders do this in three important ways:
First, lenders traditionally execute detailed loan documents that enable them
to call their loans if the borrower violates the loan's terms and conditions.'1 '
These documents also typically give the lender access to confidential informa-
tion about the borrower.
Second, banks tend to keep loan maturities relatively short and to require
borrowers to rely on revolving lines of credit." 2 This places borrowers in a
104. Leonard I. Nakamura, Commercial Bank Information: Implications for the Structure of Bank-
ing, in STRUTiURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 131, 135-36 (Michael Klausner & Lawrence J. White eds.,
1993) (illustrating the advantages of combining the deposit-taking function with the lending function).
105. Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 295.
106. Id. at 294-95; see also Nakamura, supra note 104, at 133 (asserting that banks have a "safe
clear edge" over nonbank lenders because of checking accounts).
107. Greenspan, supra note 99, at 93-94.
108. See id.
109. See Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 295.
110. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 203,
214-15 (1993) (noting that technological advances now permit lenders to monitor borrowers' inventory
and receivables status almost as soon as transactions between borrowers and their customers are
completed).
I 11. There are four types of loan covenants which mitigate the information/control dilemma: (1)
covenants that restrict the use of funds, (2) covenants that specify that firms must maintain a certain net
worth, (3) covenants that restrict the use and maintenance of collateral, and (4) covenants that require
the borrower to provide the lender with periodic information. FREDERIC S. MismIN, THE EcoNoMcs oF
MoNEY, BANKNGm, A FINANCIAL M ARs 221-22 (4th ed. 1995).
112. See Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and
Directly Placed Debt, 99 J. POL EcoN. 689, 689-91 (1991). Borrowers necessarily accept this term-
structure, because lenders will provide long-term credit only if the borrower has a good reputation, or
develops one through a succession of transactions with the lender. See id. at 691. On the other hand,
highly rated borrowers generally prefer short-term credit, because this allows them to respond to market-
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pattern of repeat dealings with particular banks, giving borrowers a strong in-
centive to refrain from moral hazard. The implicit information sent to the mar-
ket by a borrower's switch in allegiance is a great disincentive to borrower
migration. The constraints forced upon borrowers by long-term lending rela-
tionships explain why commercial paper has become a direct substitute for
bank lending in the United States."13 Investment banks have captured a large
portion of the commercial lending business of the nation's commercial banks
by replacing commercial borrowing with the sale of commercial paper. 1 4 The
short-term maturity structure of commercial paper makes it virtually impossible
for an issuing company to succumb to the moral hazard of increasing the vola-
tility (riskiness) of its expected returns after the securities have been issued and
before they mature.
Finally, in jurisdictions where it is legally permissible, such as Germany
and Japan, lenders control borrowers directly by purchasing equity positions
and thereby obtaining representation on corporate boards of directors.'" 5 These
activities reduce moral hazard not only by giving banks access to privileged
information about borrowers, but also by giving them greater influence and
control over the activities of their borrowers. Through their voting rights, for
example, German and Japanese banks can control firms' access to external
sources of funds, preventing them from obtaining financing to engage in risky
investments.
This explains why it is in the bank's interest (although perhaps not in the
interest of the firm's equity investors) for a bank simultaneously to lend money
to, and buy equity in, the same firm. The equity investments reduce the ad-
verse selection problem by providing banks with access to positions on corpo-
rate boards, which, in turn, gives them access to information about the credit-
worthiness of their clients. Additionally, banks' equity investments mitigate
the moral hazard problem both by giving banks a significant measure of control
place changes more readily. See Diamond, supra note 101, at 710. This is not the case with risky
borrowers, who prefer long-term debt in order to increase their liquidity. See id. These observations
indicate that the interests of lenders and borrowers differ, except in the case of highly rated firms with
well-established reputations. These firms, however, have a significantly greater preference for the capi-
tal markets, since they are the least information-problematic. Risky firms, by contrast, submit to bank
control and monitoring in order to resolve interest conflicts and to establish a good reputation.
113. The term "commercial paper" means the publicly issued short-term promissory notes of in-
dustrial companies (generally 90 days or less).
114. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Fu-
ture of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 775-76 (1991). Commercial paper is attractive to
issuers "because it provides ready access to capital, does not create long term financial obligations, and
does not require extensive and costly negotiations prior to issuance." Id. at 776; see also David G. Litt,
Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial
Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA.
L. Rav. 369, 375 (1990).
115. In the United States, sections 16 and 5(c) of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), ch.
89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933), generally prohibit national banks and state-chartered banks that are members of
the Federal Reserve System from owning equity securities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335 (1994); see also
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MmLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATnON 175-178, 497 (1992)
(discussing both the general rule against owning equity securities and various exceptions to the rule);
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 10, 17 (1991)
(explaining the evolution of the rule against owning equity).
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over their borrowers, and by securing some of the upside associated with their
borrowers' risky projects. But banks' highly leveraged capital structure, com-
bined with their usual liquidity needs (arising because of the large proportion of
their liabilities composed of demand deposits), ensures that commercial banks'
incentives as fixed claimants will dwarf their interests as residual claimants.
Thus, they will prefer steady investment returns over highly volatile ones.' 1 6
The Coase Theorem implies, however, that absent transaction costs, banks
as fixed claimants and nonbank equity holders could settle any conflicts by
bargaining. 17 Applying Coase's theorem to the commercial banking context,
banks would not block positive present value projects, or prevent shareholders
from engaging in risky projects that they prefer. Instead they would bargain to
be compensated for bearing additional risk, and the projects would go forward.
A simple numerical example illustrates Coase's point. Imagine a firm with
only two classes of claimants, a bank with fixed claims of $80 and shareholders
with equity claims of $20. Suppose further that the firm has the opportunity to
undertake a project that would raise its overall value from $100 to $105. The
bank would block the project if the equity claims were expected to increase in
value from $20 to $26 but the fixed claims were expected to decrease in value
from $80 to $79. If the shareholders agreed to give the bank $3 of their $6
gain, both the fixed claimant and the equity claimants would be better off if the
project went forward."1
8
Unfortunately, in the German and Japanese contexts, several factors prevent
banks and equity claimants from reaching efficient bargaining solutions. First,
German and Japanese banks justify their role in their respective corporate gov-
ernance systems on the ground that they benefit the firms with which they are
so intimately involved. Indeed, German banks owe a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders whose shares they hold in trust. For banks to bargain in the man-
ner described above, they- would have to threaten to refuse to maximize firm
value unless the shareholders agreed to share their equity gains. This sort of
bargaining would unmask serious problems with the Japanese keiretsu system
and the German universal bank system and expose banks to serious charges of
extortion.
A second, more fundamental obstacle to efficient bargaining stems from the
incompatible risk preferences of bank and nonbank equity holders. Banks pre-
fer safety for two reasons: their highly leveraged capital structures and their
undiversified human capital investments in the firms with which they have rela-
tionships. Higher present-value projects are riskier and banks prefer to avoid
this additional risk. Banks' highly leveraged capital structure makes these ad-
ditional risks appear even less attractive. Even considering potential side pay-
116. See MAcEY & MxrEmL, supra note 115, at 56-59 (discussing the concept of leverage gener-
ally, and the influence of a bank's high leverage on its capital structure strategies). ,
117. In the absence of impediments to bargaining (transaction costs), private contractual arrange-
ments among parties will produce efficient outcomes. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcoN. 1 (1960).
118. In this example, the shareholders' claims would rise in value from $20 to $23 and the bank's
claim would rise in value from $80 to $82.
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ments, banks' expected utility loss on the downside exceeds their expected
utility gain on the upside.
Agency costs and collective action problems present further impediments to
bargaining between bank and nonbank equity holders. Inside managers, who
are also fixed claimants, typically identify the firms' new projects. Outside
equity holders are widely dispersed and have no way of knowing about, much
less bargaining over, prospective new ventures. Thus, while German and Japa-
nese banks have the incentive and the means to control moral hazard problems,
German and Japanese outside equity holders have no way to bring their prefer-
ences to the bargaining table.
Finally, of course, German and Japanese bankers are imperfect agents of
their own shareholders. As fixed claimants of the banks' assets, bankers may
prefer not to maximize their institutions' profits, if doing so would require them
to assume risks for which they would not be fully compensated.
Given their capacity to control adverse selection and moral hazard
problems, however, one might expect German and Japanese banks to be more
successful than American banks, and to play a correspondingly larger role in
their respective economies. German and Japanese banks' comparative superi-
ority in controlling moral hazard reduces the banks' aggregate risk, which con-
tributes to greater profitability. Moreover, these banks' superior ability to
control moral hazard suggests that, at the margin, German and Japanese firms
would find bank financing relatively more attractive than capital-market financ-
ing. As banks exert greater control over firms, the cost of raising equity capital
adjusts upward to reflect the high risk-aversion costs caused by banks' domina-
tion of the money markets.
IV. BANKS VERSUS THE ECONOMY
While placing banks in positions of exceptional power over their borrowers
may be optimal for banks, it may not be optimal for the rest of society. Be-
cause fixed claimants, such as banks, have no incentive to see that all their
borrowers' positive present value projects are approved, granting banks a criti-
cal role in corporate governance can result in allocative inefficiency. Suppose,
for example, that a German firm faces an investment with positive present
value but very high risk. This investment will raise the price of the equity
shares by $10 per share, for a total increase of $100 million. The riskiness of
the project, however, will reduce the value of fixed claims by $10 million.
Clearly, the firm should undertake the project because the benefits significantly
outweigh the costs. But if, as in Germany, the firm's banks (in collaboration
with workers, managers and other fixed claimants) dominate the decision-mak-
ing process, then they are likely to veto the project because their fixed claims
would lose more value than their equity claims would gain.
The German and Japanese systems of strong banks and bank-dominated
corporate governance structures cannot be defended as efficient on the grounds
that these systems are the result of market forces. Like the American system,
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politics, social trends, and historical happenstance played a major role in the
development of the German and Japanese systems. As Mark Roe has observed:
In Germany, the banks captured the securities channel; the German securities
market is weak, and the banks substantially control it, a result that allows for
powerful [banks]....
Japanese postwar regulation skewed industry financing toward banks
and away from the securities market by: (1) suppressing the bond market
through collateralization and issuance regulations; (2) limiting competing
sources of corporate finance, such as equity issuance; (3) impeding the devel-
opment of investment companies; (4) requiring that banks serve as trustees for
bondholders when companies were allowed access to the bond market; and (5)
holding down the interest rates paid on deposits to enable banks to profit even
when lending at low rates. 119
The bank-dominated corporate governance structures heralded by American
commentators as a viable alternative to the Berle-Means corporation may in
fact provide private advafitages to the banks themselves, while creating ineffi-
ciencies for society as a whole. The informational advantages inherent in Ger-
man banks' domination of the shareholder voting process and control over the
supervisory boards of directors may account for some of their extraordinary
success.
After correcting for differences in GNP growth, German banks have grown
twice as fast as U.K. banks, and 1.5 times as fast as U.S. banks during the past
twenty years.120 Moreover, German banks' enhanced ability to monitor bor-
rowers appears to make lending attractive relative to financing in that nation's
capital markets. Over the past 20 years, while American corporations have
obtained more financing from debt securities than from bank loans, German
firms have raised about twice as much with bank loans as they have from debt
securities. 12' Further, the assets of German and Japanese banks comprise a far
greater percentage of their respective gross national products than the assets of
American banks do in the United States. Bank sector assets comprise 146 per-
cent of German GNP and 167 percent of Japanese GNP, but only 62 percent of
American GNP. 122 Finally, the real rate of return on equity for American
banks is just over one-half that of German banks and only one-third that of
Japanese banks. 1
23
As banks in Germany and Japan remain strong, banks in the United States
are getting weaker. In recent years, the importance of American banks in the
capital market has further declined. Depository institutions, for example, held
119. Roe, supra note 4, at 1955 (citations omitted).
120. Competition in Banking, NEWSL. LONDON Bus. SCH. INsT. FIN. & Accr., Winter 1992-93, at
6 (summarizing an address by Robert Glauber, former U.S. Treasury Under Secretary).
121. Id.
122. Roe, supra note 4, at 1999 tbl. IX (based on 1991 data).
123. SAUNDERS & WALrER, supra note 9, at 22-23, tbl. 2-1 (based on a study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York of 51 banks that were internationally active during the second half of the
1980s). The real asset growth of German banks was three times that of American banks. Japanese
banks' real assets grew by nearly seven times those of American banks. Id.
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57 percent of U.S. financial sector assets in 1978, but only 33 percent in
1991.124 Meanwhile, mutual funds and pension funds increased their market
share from 11 percent to 25 percent.' 25 On the asset side, commercial paper
underwritten by investment banks came to be seen by the largest, highest qual-
ity borrowers as a superior alternative to bank loans. In 1991, nonfinancial
corporations raised $107 billion from commercial paper, all of which would
have been funded through bank borrowing only a decade before.' 2 6 Moreover,
finance companies that are funded with commercial paper have begun to com-
pete with banks. By the end of 1991, finance companies had $315 billion in
loans outstanding to American businesses.' 2 7 This figure is almost one-half of
the $650 billion in commercial loans outstanding at that time.128
The story from America is clear. Technological changes and changes in
underlying market conditions have caused a systematic diminution in the de-
mand for banks' services. Services that once were performed by banks now are
routinely provided by other sorts of firms in the United States. The problem for
American banks is that they do not have the same informational advantage over
other financial intermediaries as German and Japanese banks enjoy.
Banks' ability to earn a profit on the spread between their cost of funds and
their return on assets results from their ability to process information about
credit risk better than other types of financial intermediaries. As Alan Green-
span has observed:
The heart of financial intermediation is the ability to obtain and use informa-
tion. The high cost of gathering and using facts in the past meant that banks
and other intermediaries could profit from their cumulative store of knowledge
about borrowers by making significantly more informed credit decisions than
most other market participants. These other market participants were thus
obliged to permit depository intermediaries to make credit decisions in finan-
cial markets and therefore allow bank credit to substitute for what would other-
wise be their own direct acquisition of credit market instruments.
129
In the United States, however, the advance of computer and telecommunica-
tions technology has dramatically reduced the costs of recording, transmitting,
and processing this information. These technological advances have allowed
firms in need of capital to bypass commercial banks and to enter the capital
market for funds. For borrowers, "[o]n-line data bases, coupled with powerful
computers and wide-ranging telecommunication facilities, can now provide po-
tential investors with virtually the same timely credit and market information
that was once available only to [banks]."' 30
Beyond the decline in demand for banks' asset-valuation skills, changing
U.S. financial markets have provided alternative vehicles for raising capital and





129. Greenspan, supra note 99, at 93.
130. Id.
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securing credit-both services traditionally supplied by banks. In particular,
the development of secondary and new issues markets for trading securities has
made it increasingly easy for business firms to raise capital through public of-
ferings of securities or securitization. Other alternative financial mechanisms
for raising capital in the United States that have displaced banks include: mort-
gage-based securities, consumer receivables financing, consumer loan-based
securities, and commercial paper.
131
The steady decline in American commercial banks' overall share of the
financial markets has not been distributed evenly over their assets. Rather,
securitization has replaced the best assets on banks' balance sheets, resulting in
an increasingly risky American banking industry. As noted above, the distinc-
tive characteristic of commercial banks is that they specialize in analyzing and
holding nonstandardized or "information-problematic" credit risks in their port-
folios. 132 Typically, borrowers with few information problems will not use
bank borrowing as much as other firms but instead will issue traded securities,
along with commercial paper and medium-term notes-all of which are more
economical than bank borrowing.133 But because capital market participants
are less willing to extend credit to issuers about whom the market has little
knowledge, information-problematic borrowers frequently must turn to more
expensive commercial loans from specialized depository institutions.
Over time, the ability of American security markets to process information
has improved. Assets once considered opaque to market analysts and thus not
securitizable (like credit card receivables and home mortgages) can now easily
be securitized.134 Assets that are extremely difficult to analyze, and thus can-
not be easily securitized, are kept on banks' balance sheets. Thus, banks that
once held a balanced mix of safe and risky assets are finding themselves stuck
with only risky, information-problematic assets. 135 American banks essentially
are left with a simple choice-shrink, or become riskier:
As assets that are more easily susceptible to monitoring are stripped out of
banks' assets and securitized, banks are faced with the following choice: they
can either shrink by declining to replace securitized assets with new assets, or
else they can . . . make loans to borrowers with more severe information
problems than previously had been made.'
36
131. Greenspan, supra note 99, at 94.
132. Miller & Macey, supra note 99, at 296; see also Litan, supra note 100, at 8-10 (describing
how dealers and brokers match savers and investors directly, while financial intermediaries assume the
risk of an imperfect match).
133. Miller & Macey, supra note 99, at 296-97.
134. Id.; see also ScHwARcz, supra note 102, at 4 (examples of securitized assets include mort-
gage loans, trade receivables, and credit card receivables).
135. Macey & Miller, supra note 99, at 296; see also TAMAR FRANKEL, SEcnuRmzrAToN: STR'Uc-
TURED FnANC, FiNANC.AL AssEr PooLs, AND Assar-BAKED SEaCURMs § 4.9 (1994) (arguing that
generally, the best borrowers have left banks for financing in secondary markets and thus banks must
compete for borrowers who cannot resort to those markets).
136. MACEY & MIutR, supra note 115, at 297.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
We wish to stress that our point is not that the American system of corpo-
rate governance is superior to its German and Japanese counterparts. Our point
is merely to show that the supposed advantages of the German and Japanese
systems have been exaggerated, while the costs have been underemphasized.
These costs come not only in the form of excessive risk aversion, which leads
to a stifling of innovation, but also manifest themselves in the form of illiquid,
undeveloped, and poorly functioning capital markets.
For several reasons, German and Japanese capital market participants have
fewer incentives than similarly situated Americans. First, German and Japa-
nese banks reduce the potential gain from investing in the stock market by
limiting upside gains to residual claimants. Second, the highly concentrated
patterns of share ownership in Germany and Japan have made hostile take-
overs, a major source of potential gains for target company shareholders, prac-
tically impossible for most insurgent groups to mount successfully. Third,
these concentrated patterns of share ownership also reduce order flow in the
market, thereby depriving it of liquidity. Finally, and perhaps most important,
the core purpose of the German and Japanese corporate governance systems
has been to produce stability for systems which were characterized by massive
uncertainty in the immediate post-war period.137 But there is growing evidence
that this kind of stability is not a virtue today, with global competition and
rapid technological innovation placing a far higher premium on innovation and
flexibility than on stability.
For purposes of comparing the American system of corporate governance
with the Japanese and German systems described above, we focus in this sec-
tion on three sets of problems existing within the American system. The first is
the possibility of excessive risktaking. Just as the German and Japanese bank-
dominated systems described above may cause firms to forsake potentially
profitable projects that appear too risky to them, the American system may
cause firms to undertake excessively risky projects because weak banks in the
United States are unable to monitor and control excessive risktaking as effec-
tively as German and Japanese banks do. The second consideration is the de-
clining capacity of market -forces to discipline managers and improve corporate
performance in the American system. In recent years, politics increasingly has
interfered with the functioning of the market. In particular, politics has reduced
the efficacy of the market for corporate control, which is the central device for
disciplining managers in market-oriented corporate governance systems such as
those in the United States and Britain. Finally, a set of seemingly minor rules
in the United States artificially impedes the ability of fixed claimants to moni-
tor and control borrowers. Thus, while the level of control observed in the
137. This is especially true in post-war Japan, MoRcK & NAXAmuRA, supra note 28, at 6, despite
the post-war efforts of the occupation forces. Roe, supra note 4, at 1972. Germany, which has relied
heavily on central banks since Bismarck, naturally looked to central banks as sources of economic
stability after the Second World War. See id. at 1971.
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Japanese and German bank-dominated systems probably is too high, the level
of bank control in the American system probably is artificially low.
A. The Problem of Excessive Risktaking
Just as fixed claimants can transfer wealth to themselves from equity claim-
ants by reducing a firm's riskiness expost (i.e., after a firm's capital structure
has been determined), so too may equity claimants increase their own wealth at
the expense of the fixed claimants by increasing the firm's riskiness. 138 In a
properly functioning corporate governance structure, the fixed claimants and
the shareholders will reach the appropriate bargaining equilibrium between the
risk-preferring proclivities of the shareholders and the risk-averse proclivities
of the fixed claimants.
Several features of the American corporate governance system prevent
shareholders from acting opportunistically through increased risktaking. First,
fixed claimants may protect themselves against this contingency contractu-
ally.139 Second, American banks often make loans with relatively short maturi-
ties, thereby forcing borrowers to rely on revolving lines of credit. Because
borrowers realize that they must obtain bank approval for additional credit
when their loans reach maturity, banks gain leverage over borrowers through
repeat dealings. Third, by buying convertible bonds (convertible into equity
claims), fixed claimants may reduce borrowers' incentives to engage in exces-
sive risktaking because borrowers know that the bondholders are first in line for
repayment in the event of default. If the shareholders' risky investments are
successful, however, convertible bondholders convert their fixed claims into
equity and share in the upside. Fourth, because American shareholders are gen-
erally widely dispersed-each owning only a tiny fraction of a company's out-
standing shares-they have little incentive to monitor managers and are largely
subject to managers' risk preferences. Because managers are averse to the high
levels of risktaking shareholders prefer, this agency cost helps other fixed
claimants such as banks. For these reasons, the danger that American firms
will engage in excessive risktaking appears relatively small compared to the
danger that Japanese and German firms will avoid socially efficient risks.
B. The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control lies at the heart of the American system of
corporate governance. Hostile bidders target poorly performing firms and re-
place their inadequate or shirking managers with rival management teams. 140
138. See Porter, supra note 5, at 67 ("The U.S. system first and foremost advances the goals of
shareholders interested in near-term appreciation of their shares-even at the expense of the long-term
performance of American companies.").
139. See note 111 supra and accompanying text; Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis ofBond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117, 124-26 (1979) (describing
various contractual mechanisms used by fixed claimants to control shareholders).
140. See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 119, 129-31 (1992) (describing takeovers as a backstop mechanism for monitoring performance
when other corporate governance devices fail).
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Between 1985 and 1990, hostile takeovers accounted for $140 billion in U.S.
financial transactions. 141 Moreover, innovations in corporate finance, such as
bridge financing and junk bonds, created a competitive environment in which
virtually every firm was a potential takeover target. The frequency of hostile
takeovers increased managerial efficiency, as high share price is considered the
strongest hostile takeover defense.142
Contrary to critics' claims, studies show that hostile takeovers do not lead
to massive layoffs. 143 Indeed most blue collar workers retain their jobs after
hostile takeovers. The layoffs occur among middle managers, who usually find
replacement jobs surprisingly quickly. 144
Available evidence also refutes the hypothesis that hostile takeovers are
undesirable because they induce managers to focus too much on short-term
share prices to the detriment of long-term corporate performance. Share prices
set by capital markets reflect the present value of corporations' expected future
returns. Thus, firms investing in research and development ("R&D") and other
long-term projects will not suffer from lower share prices and increased
chances of hostile acquisition because their share prices will adjust to reflect
the future payoffs of investments in R&D.145 Thus, it is unsurprising that hos-
tile acquirors rarely slash R&D investments in acquired firms. Similarly, firms
with heavy R&D investments are less likely to be subjects of hostile takeovers
than are other firms. 146
American corporations are not beleaguered by too many hostile takeovers;
rather, regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies stifle the market's
demand for hostile takeovers, thereby limiting their number. The number of
hostile takeovers in the United States declined precipitously from a high of
forty-six in 1988 to only two in 1991.147 State antitakeover laws are more
prevalent and increasingly prohibitive, a testament to management's political
141. Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43, at 6.
142. High share prices make takeovers prohibitively expensive. See Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HAgv. L. REv. 1161, 1174 (1981) ("Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the
chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for shares."); see
also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VANo. L. REv. 1259, 1264 (1982)
(arguing that the market for corporate control "simultaneously gives managers of all firms who wish to
avoid a takeover an incentive to operate efficiently and to keep share prices high").
143. Romano, supra note 140, at 172.
144. Id.
145. Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis.
L. REv. 467, 479-82.
146. Id. at 482.
147. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protec-
tion or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 931, 979 (1993). In the first quarter of 1995,
however, mergers and acquisitions in the United States reached $73.2 billion, the highest first-quarter
level since 1989. Steven Lipin, Mergers and Acquisitions in 1st Quarter Increased 35% from the Year
Before, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995, at A3. Recent mergers and acquisitions in the United States do not
appear to be directed at ousting inefficient management, but rather to achieving synergistic gains
through economies of scale or scope in operations. Some acquisitions may be designed to increase the
acquiror's market share, rather than to benefit from improving the target's performance. See Greg
Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions Set Records, But Activity Lacked that 80s Pizazz, VAU. ST. J., Jan.
3, 1995, at R8.
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acumen in dealing with state legislatures at the expense of out-of-state share-
holders.' 48 In fact, one of the worst consequences of America's widely dis-
persed share ownership is shareholders' inability to form effective political
coalitions to block management's political mobilization against hostile take-
overs. Political maneuvering, for example, culminated in the Pennsylvania's
1990 antitakeover law, which represents a massive wealth transfer from share-
holders to incumbent management. 149
In addition to antitakeover laws, incumbent management has successfully
persuaded state legislatures to pass so-called "other constituency" statutes.
These statutes empower corporate management to consider the interests of em-
ployees, local communities, suppliers, and customers when deciding whether
and how to resist a hostile takeover.150 These thinly disguised efforts to ad-
vance management interests at the expense of shareholders permit managers to
defend themselves against shareholders' lawsuits after adopting defensive tac-
tics to entrench themselves in office. 151 Pursuant to these statutes, managers
may mount credible arguments that their resistance to takeovers furthers the in-
terests of some nonshareholder constituency or other, thus giving courts a legal
hook upon which to hang their decisions favoring incumbent management.
State court judges have provided little, if any, comfort to shareholders. In
particular, they have done little to curb the use of antitakeover devices, such as
the poison pill, which may be adopted by a target company's board of directors
without a shareholder vote.' 52 In December 1993, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court prevented Paramount from using its poison pill to foil a hostile
takeover by QVC. 153 This decision may prompt other American courts to look
more favorably upon outside shareholders' interests which, in turn, could usher
in a new era of hostile takeovers in the United States.
One legitimate complaint against hostile takeovers as a corporate govern-
ance mechanism is that "companies have to go further off course before
attracting a hostile bid than they might if managers were monitored continu-
ously.' 54 Hostile bids are extremely capital intensive, not only because they
require major financing commitments, but also because bidders must invest a
substantial amount of resources in research to identify undervalued targets
before ever making a takeover bid. Unless a firm is substantially undervalued,
bidders will be unable to recoup these capital and search costs.
148. Macey, supra note 145, at 468-70.
149. See Act of Apr. 27, 1990, P.L. 129, 1990 Pa. Laws 36 (codified in scattered sections of 15
PA. CoNs, STAT.). Pennsylvania's antitakeover rules are "more extreme than those of any other state."
WrVuAm A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAms aYR, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON BusINEss AssocIATIoNs:
AGENCy, PAgrTamsHs, AND CoaI'oRAoNs 819 (2d ed. 1994).
150. Macey, supra note 145, at 469.
151. The statutes also advance management interests at the expense of employees. See Romano,
supra note 140, at 171-73.
152. See DEn~is J. BLOcK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADiN, THE BustNmss JuDGmENT
RULE: FmuciARY Dtmas OF CORPORATE DUcroRPs 233-37 (4th ed. 1993).
153. Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
154. Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43, at 13.
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For at least three reasons, however, this flaw in the corporate control market
does not disadvantage the American system of corporate governance relative to
the German and Japanese systems. First, it does not really distinguish the
American system of corporate governance from its German and Japanese coun-
terparts. Like American corporations, German and Japanese firms must go
substantially off course before attracting outside intervention. As fixed claim-
ants, German and Japanese banks are unconcerned with small deviations from
optimal performance levels that do not threaten their return on capital.
A second problem with criticizing the takeover market as too costly is that
the market for corporate control affects managerial performance even in the
absence of a formally announced takeover bid. A robust market for corporate
control improves management's performance because incumbents inevitably
prefer to reduce the probability that an outside bid will be made. Incumbent
management will be unsure how much better a particular rival management
team is; consequently, management will be unsure how far the firm's share
price must fall before attracting a hostile bid. This uncertainty creates an incen-
tive for managers to improve the firm's performance, even if a hostile offer
never actually materializes.1
5 5
Finally, commentators who argue that takeovers are too expensive errone-
ously conceptualize takeovers as an all-or-nothing proposition. Investors need
not launch a full-blown tender offer to put a target company effectively in play.
Through a proxy contest, for example, investors may launch a takeover for as
little as $5000 (down from $1 million a few years ago).' 5 6 Similarly, institu-
tional investors often purchase large stakes in troubled firms, then use their
votes to install directors on corporate boards to "agitate for better perform-
ance."' 57 To exploit these strategies such that management improves, potential
insurgents must present a credible threat.158 In the German and Japanese sys-
tems, insufficient capital market liquidity-combined with the intense loyalty
of the banks towards incumbent management-limits the ability of insurgent
shareholders credibly to threaten a hostile takeover in the event that perform-
ance fails to improve.
This is not to suggest that the market for corporate control worked perfectly
in the United States during the 1980s. Critics are correct to argue that share
prices must decline too far before the market reacts. Rather, the point is that
monitors in Germany and Japan also lack the incentive to intervene before firm
values have declined significantly. Moreover, if the problem with the takeover
market is that performance must decline too much before the market begins to
operate, the solution is to design a regulatory system that decreases the costs of
155. See Macey, supra note 145, at 472-73. Naturally, some managers will divert their efforts to
the legislative arena and work for legal protection, rather than aim for protection through robust per-
formance in the market. Id.
156. Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43, at 16.
157. Id.
158. The paradigmatic American example of this threat is Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway,
Inc. Buffett does not threaten the continued existence ofnonperforming companies, but rather the man-
agement of such companies, that is, he replaces the management of such companies with managers who
are more likely to improve the company's performance. See id.
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intervention. This is not occurring in Germany, Japan, or the United States,
largely because of the awesome power of incumbent management to resist
change.'
59
C. Rules Limiting Monitoring and Control by U.S. Intermediaries
Perhaps the most effective criticism of the American system of corporate
governance is that legal rules prevent American financial intermediaries from
contractually protecting themselves against the moral hazard problem posed by
shareholders. Although fixed claimants clearly have an incentive to monitor
and control corporate borrowers, a variety of legal rules in the United States
constrain fixed claimants' ability to control moral hazard. 160 As Roe observes,
"American legal restrictions have historically kept American banks small and
weak, by banning them from operating nationally, entering commerce, affiliat-
ing with investment banks, equity mutual funds, or insurers, or from coordinat-
ing stockholdings with these other intermediaries."' 61 Our emphasis differs
from Roe's. We are less interested in the ability of banks to dominate Ameri-
can corporate finance, and more concerned with legal restrictions that prevent
American banks from even protecting their exposure as fixed claimants. These
restrictions raise capital costs and reduce allocative efficiency by raising the
costs of fixed claims in American firms.
In a nutshell, several American legal doctrines expose lenders to potential
liability if they attempt to write contracts that protect themselves from borrow-
ers' moral hazard.' 62 Many of these liability rules derive from the reasonable
doctrine that banks have a general obligation of good faith toward borrow-
ers,163 but courts often interpret them in a manner inconsistent with basic free-
dom of contract. As a result, expanded rules of lender liability have enabled
159. Japanese main bank intervention, for example, is consistently unlikely regardless of the
firm's performance according to various indicia. See MORCK & NAKAMuRA, supra note 28, at 25-26,
55; see also Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 31, at 850 (analyzing low turnover amongst Fortune
500 companies).
160. Mark Roe has chronicled a number of these rules. See Roe, supra note 115, at 16-31 (ana-
lyzing these rules in the context of financial institutions); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on
Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27 J. FiN. EcoN. 7, 9-21 (1990) (describing how law
constrains financial institutions' role in the corporate structure).
161. Roe, supra note 4, at 1948.
162. See, eg., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1Ith Cir. 1990) (holding
that "a secured creditor may incur... liability.., by participating the financial management of a facility
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous waste"), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding an implied good faith contractual obligation requiring a lender to give notice to a borrower
before refusing to advance funds under their agreement); Brown v. Avemeo Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367,
1375-76 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that a good faith belief of security impairment is needed to enforce an
acceleration provision; technical breach is insufficient); Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n,
447 P.2d 609, 617-20 (Cal. 1968) (stating that a financier of home builders has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in ascertaining that houses are not defective, and other parties' negligence does not
insulate the financier from liability); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 686 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (stating that a lender's attempts to enforce a management-change clause constituted duress).
163. MAcny & MILLER, supra note 115, at 206.
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borrowers to transfer wealth to themselves by opportunistically suing banks
when banks threaten to enforce their contracts with borrowers.' 6 4
When banks have threatened, for example, to enforce a management change
clause (a contractual provision ostensibly allowing lenders to declare a default
if top officers are appointed who are not approved by lenders), borrowers have
been successful in suing banks for interfering with contractual relations be-
tween borrowers and their employees. 165 Courts even have forced banks to
loan more money or to give more advance notice of termination of a lending
relationship than required by contract. 166 Furthermore, banks which become
actively involved in the affairs of borrowers in order to protect the value of
their security interests may face massive liability for environmental harm the
firm causes.'
67
Bankruptcy rules further chill American banks' incentive to take an active
role in the affairs of borrowers, thereby discouraging intervention when it
would be most helpful-when borrowers are in financial distress. Specifically,
U.S. bankruptcy law strips senior lenders of their claims to collateral or subor-
dinates their claims to those of junior lenders, or both, if the lender exercises
some degree of control over the borrower. This principle, which is known as
equitable subordination, provides a strong disincentive for banks to play an
active role in corporate governance. In the classic American Lumber case, 168
an American bank assisted in restructuring a troubled debtor after it had ad-
vanced the debtor extra funds. When the debtor began to fail despite these
efforts, the bank tried to recover its funds. Other creditors complained of pref-
erential treatment, and they persuaded the court to subordinate the bank's
claims to theirs:
While [the bank] argues that subordination will cause members of the financial
community to feel that they cannot give financial assistance to failing compa-
nies, but must instead foreclose on their security interests and collect debts
swiftly, not leaving any chance for survival, the Court is singularly
unimpressed.
169
Thus, America's corporate governance problem may not stem from a lack
of concentrated share blocks and powerful financial intermediaries as Roe sug-
gests. 170 Rather, the problem may arise from American courts' and legisla-
tures' unwillingness to enforce the contractual provisions upon which financial
intermediaries and borrowers agree. Enforcing such contractual provisions not
164. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 140-42 (1989)
(discussing various interpretations of the duty of good faith and relevance of this duty in deterring
opportunistic behavior by both lenders and borrowers).
165. See, e.g., Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d at 690.
166. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759-63.
167. See Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557-68 (noting that a creditor may incur liability for a
borrower's affairs if its participation in management indicates ability to intervene in the corporation's
affairs). But see In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "some actual
management of the facility" is required to establish liability of secured creditor for a borrower's affairs).
168. In re American Lumber Co., 5 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
169. Id. at 478.
170. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
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only would protect the banks from moral hazard but would also help borrowers
avoid excessive borrowing costs.
VI. CONVERGENCE OF THE SYSTEMS
Some commentators have argued recently that American, German and Japa-
nese systems of corporate governance are converging.171 For convergence to
take place, however, three things would have to happen. First, German and
Japanese banks would have to reduce their concentrated share ownership to
promote more liquid capital markets and to develop a market for corporate
control. Second, the German and Japanese systems would have to decrease
bank control over corporate funding to facilitate the development of capital
markets. And finally, of course, patterns of concentrated share ownership
would have to emerge in the United States.
With regard to a decrease in concentrated levels of German and Japanese
share ownership, no apparent convergence is taking place. In Germany, bank
ownership of large blocks of stock is increasing, rather than decreasing, and in
Japan bank ownership of stock has remained remarkably stable over time.172 It
does appear, however, that German and Japanese banks are losing some of their
ability to control corporate borrowers. 173 Taken together, these two facts might
suggest that corporate governance in Germany and Japan will improve as the
banks' interests as shareholders begin to overwhelm their interests as fixed
claimants. Although this is a distinct and promising possibility, it may not fully
eliminate the conflicts that exist between banks and outside equity holders.
These conflicts originate not only from the banks' status as fixed claimants, but
also from the banks' capital structure, which is characterized by extremely
highly leveraged portfolios and by substantial liability for demand deposits.
171. See, eg., Roe, supra note 4, at 1930.
172. Id. at 1959.
173. In 1991-1994, for example, quoted Japanese nonfinancial firms sold Y7.1 trillion ($60 bil-
lion) in accumulated cross-shareholdings, reversing the post-war trend. Japan Inc Frays at the Edges,
EcoNo,,sT, June 3, 1995, at 67. In the first quarter of 1995, those firms sold another Y340 billion in
cross-shareholdings. Id. Even if the first quarter trend continues through 1995, however, the resulting
¥1.36 trillion reduction would represent only a tiny fraction of the Y85 trillion of accumulated Japanese
cross-shareholdings. Id. Furthermore, while there is some increase in Japanese merger and acquisition
activity, this increase is relatively insignificant. See Jathon Sapsford, Mergers' Growing Acceptance in
Japan is Fortified by Fair Trade Panel's Move, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1994, at A7 (discussing the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission's reduction of regulatory burdens on mergers valued below YI0 billion
(S89 million). These nominal changes in favor of outside shareholders are unlikely to lead to a robust
market for corporate control in the near future.
Nevertheless, the primacy of bank lending as a source Japanese and German corporate funding
appears to be eroding. See RAMsEYER, supra note 55, at 12-14 (giving a historical summary of the entry
of Japanese firms into the domestic bond market); Roe, supra note 4, at 1959-60 (stating that a world-
wide trend toward debt-securitization is reducing the influence of commercial banks); Citibank Structur-
ing German Deal to Add Investors, AssET SALEs REP., June 19, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File (describing proposal to securitize German credit card receivables); Galleon Sets
Sale for Germany, AssEr SALEs REP., Sep. 4, 1995, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
File (describing an agreement to securitize receivables from a mid-market German machine tool manu-
facturer); Larry Zoglin, Practice Serves Long Term Business Objectives: Stable Cross-Holding of
Shares Likely to Withstand Pressures, JAPAN EcoN. J., June 21, 1986, at 7, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (noting that corporate financing is trending away from bank loans toward the issu-
ance of securities).
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Because this capital structure requires the banks to maintain stable cash flows,
German and Japanese banks have strong incentives to act like fixed claimants
despite their substantial equity holdings in their clients.
Finally, commentators tentatively have hypothesized that American firms
may be evolving "toward the German and Japanese style of ownership" be-
cause American financial intermediaries are taking a more active role in the
management of the firms in which they invest. 174 Commentators who analo-
gize this emerging pattern of relational investing in the United States to the
corporate governance structures of Germany and Japan fail to recognize the
critical distinction between relational investors in the United States and banks
in Germany and Japan. American financial intermediaries make equity invest-
ments, 175 funding those investments with equity or long-term debt, 176 whereas
the German and Japanese banks make predominantly lending investments,
funding them primarily with short-term debt. Thus, because American firms'
power and authority to monitor is not compromised by the same conflicts of
interest which characterize Japanese and German bank investments, the new
American financial intermediaries probably will represent the interests of eq-
uity claimants more effectively than their Japanese and German counterparts.
Even if relational investing develops in the United States, the market for
corporate control will remain critical to the success of America's corporate
governance system. The effectiveness of large-block shareholders' efforts to
influence and monitor American firms depends fundamentally on those rela-
tional investors' ability to threaten inefficient management with replacement.
Unless incumbent management believes that large-block purchasers will take
control or transfer their stakes to hostile bidders if performance falters, it has no
reason to heed relational investors. In other words, the growth of relational
investing complements, but does not replace, a robust market for corporate
control..
Responding to American banks' declining market share in the financial
services sector of the world economy, legislators have recently offered several
proposals to reduce the legal barriers that the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956177 and the Glass-Steagall Act178 pose to affiliations between banks and
securities firms. As the banking industry's share of U.S. financial assets has
174. Roe, supra note 4, at 1965. Warren Buffett's firm, Berkshire Hathaway, provides the model
for America's new, relational form of investing. Similarly, Lazard Freres and Dillon Read, two Ameri-
can investment banks, now offer investment funds that specialize in identifying undervalued and poorly
managed companies, and contributing managerial expertise to improving performance within these
firms. Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43, at 16.
175. See, e.g., Corporate Governance Survey, supra note 43, at 16 (reporting that the California
Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers) "wants to enlarge its focus on underperformance by
buying big stakes in troubled finrs").
176. See, e.g., Briefly: Securities, L.A. TiMms, Mar. 21, 1995, at D2 (reporting that Warren Buffet
asked Berkshire Hathaway's shareholders to approve the issuance of up to one million new preferred
shares because the firm "might need to issue such shares in future acquisitions').
177. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994). The Bank Holding Company Act currently prohibits bank
holding companies, which are firms that own or control banks, as well as the affiliates of bank holding
companies, from holding the shares of any company that is not a bank, § 1843(a)(1), unless, among
other things, the company's activities are "so closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks as to be a proper incident thereto," § 1843(c)(8).
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decreased from 66 percent to less than 30 percent over the last twenty years, 17 9
and as American banks have disappeared from the ranks of the world's major
financial institutions, policymakers have come to realize that allowing banks to
affiliate with the providers of other financial services may enable the banking
industry to compete in the global financial markets.180
These proposed reforms are important in the context of corporate govern-
ance because, in theory, they could support the argument that the financial in-
dustry in the United States is evolving in the direction of the German universal
banks or the Japanese keiretsu. The proposed reforms to Glass-Steagall in the
United States, however, are not likely to affect American corporate governance.
In particular, they will not permit American banks to control the corporations
with which they have lending relationships. The well developed capital mar-
kets for debt and equity in the United States provide outlets for American firms
who need capital, thereby precluding dominance by commercial banks. In
other words, even if American banks are allowed to make equity investments in
firms to which they have loaned money, those banks will be unable to control
the borrowers' corporate governance.
On February 2, 1995, Alfonse D'Amato, Chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs introduced the Depository Institu-
tion Affiliation Act (DIAA),l81 and on February 27, 1995, Jim Leach,
Chairman of the House Banking Committee, introduced the Financial Services
Competitiveness Act of 1995.182 These proposals would transform bank hold-
ing companies into financial services holding companies, expanding the scope
of permissible activities for the nonbank affiliates to include any activities
deemed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to be "finan-
cial in nature."18 3 Moreover, these proposals would expand the powers of
holding companies' securities affiliates to permit them to underwrite corporate
debt, equity and mutual fund shares. 184 Finally, the legislation would modify
the Glass-Steagall Act by allowing unlimited affiliation between commercial
banks and investment banking organizations. 85
178. The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) generally requires the separation of commercial banking and
merchant and investment banking activities. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378(a) (1994).
179. Lise Simmons, Banking: D'Amato Introduces Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Financial
Services Modernization, 1995 Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 23, at A-23 (Feb. 3, 1995), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
180. Alfonse D'Amato, My Plan for a Stronger Financial Industry, VALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at
A18.
181. S. 337, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Representative Richard Baker offered a companion
bill in the House on February 3, 1995. H.R. 814, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
182. H.R. 1062, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
183. H.R. 1062 § 150(1); S. 337 § 101(a)(a); James Leach, A Two Way Street': Banking Panel's
Bill Lets Securities Firms be Equal Partners, not Subsidiaries, of Banhs, ROLL CALL, Mar. 27, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Accordingly, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
would be renamed the "Financial Services Holding Company Act of 1995." Id.
184. H.R. 1062 § 103(a); S. 337 § 101(c)(10).
185. In particular, section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994)),
which prohibits affiliations between banks and firms engaged principally in the securities business,
would be repealed by the House bill, H.R. 1062 § 101(a), and would be amended by the Senate bill to
November 1995]
HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 109 1995-1996
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
We strongly favor the liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act to permit
greater involvement by banks in the securities business.186 Greater commercial
bank involvement in American corporate governance is not likely to give rise to
the same problems engendered by German and Japanese bank activities be-
cause the structure of the American financial services sector will prevent bank
domination present in the German, and to a lesser extent, the Japanese systems.
From the perspective of American banking organizations, greater involve-
ment in the securities business will bring significant benefits in the form of
lower risk through diversification,' 8 7 and lower operating costs through in-
creased economies of scale and scope. In fact, studies have shown that far from
increasing the riskiness of banking institutions, securities activities actually
make banks safer. Eugene White, for example, found that the securities opera-
tions of commercial banks did not impair their stability prior to Glass-
Steagall-banks that engaged in securities activities did not have any higher
earning variance or lower capital ratios than banks without such operations.'18
Moreover, banks with securities operations were actually less likely to fail than
banks without such operations.' 89 In the bank crisis at the height of the Great
Depression, more than 25 percent of all U.S. national banks failed, but less than
10 percent of banks with securities affiliates failed. 190
Banks and securities affiliates tend to share economies of scope because the
information that banks gather in the course of making credit evaluations also
can be used to make decisions regarding the underwriting and selling of the
securities. Merging affiliates' data processing and other back-office operations
will create economies of scale for the holding companies. Finally, the riskiness
of bank lending activities can be reduced because, under the proposed legisla-
tion, banks may gain access to more extensive customer information through
their affiliation with other enterprises, thereby enabling them to make more
informed judgments regarding whether to extend credit to certain borrowers.
All these benefits can be realized without giving banks control over their
corporate clients sufficient to harm the interests of nonbank shareholders.
American banks will not have any expanded securities powers under the new
legislative proposals; they will simply be allowed to form more extensive affili-
ations with securities firms. And American securities firms, unlike European
permit unlimited affiliations between securities affiliates and other affiliates of the financial services
holding company. S. 337 § 104(a).
186. One of us has argued that there are no plausible public interest justifications for the Glass-
Steagall restrictions on banks' securities activities, and that the most convincing explanation for the
statute's enactment is that special interest groups within the banking industry succeeded in persuading
Congress to cartelize the economy's banking sector. Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legis-
lation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1-2 (1984).
187. See Jonathan R. Macey, M. Wayne Marr & S. David Young, The Glass-Steagall Act and the
Riskiness of Financial Intermediaries, 14 Ras. L. & EcoN. 19, 25-27 (1991) (explaining that firms
engaged in both commercial and investment banking may not be riskier than firms engaged only in
commercial banking).
188. Eugene White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment Banking Activi-
ties of National Banks, 23 EXPLoPRATioNs ECON. HisT. 33 (1986).
189. Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajarn, Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of
the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, 84 Am. EcoN. REy. 810, 811 n.3 (1994).
190. White supra note 188, at 40.
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banks, make a point of refraining from intrusion into the corporate governance
of their clients. Rather, American investment banks limit their activities to un-
derwriting, trading, and providing general investment banking advice about
mergers and acquisitions and corporate finance.
American investment banks are further unlikely to disrupt internal corpo-
rate affairs because the U.S. financial services sector is uniquely characterized
both by intense competition and by heterogeneity. Investment banking firms
which attempted to make unwelcome intrusions into the corporate governance
of their clients would quickly find themselves without clients because, unlike
Japanese and German corporations, American firms can switch investment
banking relationships with impunity. Moreover, in the United States, powerful,
independent, nonbank institutional investors such as insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, and mutual funds, would strongly object to efforts by financial serv-
ices holding companies to assert themselves in the corporate governance of
publicly traded companies.
Path dependence provides a final reason why the current proposals to liber-
alize the scope of permissible bank affiliations does not pose any cognizable
danger to the corporate governance of American firms. Simply put, for the
reasons we have advanced in this article, American capital markets have re-
placed the languishing domestic banking industry as the principal supplier of
capital to American industry. Consequently, it is too late for American banking
organizations to use their influence over corporate governance to retard the
growth of American capital markets.
Thus, by permitting the new affiliations, the proposed reforms could
strengthen the American banking industry, but the proposals do not, in and of
themselves, pose the danger that banking institutions will use their influence
over corporate clients to advance their interests as lenders at the expense of
other shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Vigorous competition in the product and labor markets is most powerful
corporate governance device of all. Competition in the marketplace forces
firms to compete fervently for capital. For this reason, the rapid globalization
of trade and investment should lead to improved corporate governance through-
out the world. Naturally, those economies with the best corporate governance
structures will outperform rival economies at the margin.
The purpose of this Article has been to show that the "continuous and tex-
tured" monitoring that characterizes relational investing in Japan and Germany
is not a panacea. The problems posed by these systems result from straightfor-
ward conflicts of interest between risk-averse fixed claimants, who control in-
vestments, and residual claimants, who have the greatest stake in the firm's
financial success. The highly leveraged capital structure of banks and their
large exposure to demand deposits further enhance the banks' conservative ten-
dencies. Because banks' risk preferences are more closely aligned with man-
November 1995]
HeinOnline -- 48 Stan. L. Rev. 111 1995-1996
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
agement's than with those of equity investors-or society-banks make poor
monitors and cannot be expected to maximize the value of the firm.
The failure of existing theories of relational investing to recognize the con-
flict of interest between equity markets and fixed claimants exemplifies an un-
fortunate tendency to treat all financial intermediaries alike.191 Moreover,
commentators who extol the virtues of bank dominated corporate governance
systems fail to consider adequately the adverse effects such systems have had
on the development of capital markets in the countries that have employed
them. Put differently, the strong role played by financial intermediaries has
retarded the growth of primary and secondary markets for equity, and has
thereby stifled an important source of risk capital for firms.
The American corporate governance system is by no means perfect. In the
United States, shareholders must rely on the threat of a takeover to discipline
managers. Outside bidders protect shareholder interests by monitoring man-
agement in publicly traded firms and by launching hostile bids when firms
underperform. But in recent years, politics has interfered with the efficacy of
the market for corporate control: State antitakeover statutes have dramatically
reduced the number of hostile takeovers in the United States, diverting wealth
from shareholders, who must endure firms' suboptimal performance, to manag-
ers, who no longer face the threat of displacement. In the absence of a healthy
takeover market, the weakness of American financial intermediaries is dis-
turbing. Unfortunately, several American legal doctrines have artificially lim-
ited the ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers. As a result, while the
degree of banks' influence in Germany and Japan is probably excessive, the
level of banks' influence in the United States is likely too low.
The problem in Germany and Japan is that the interests of equity investors
are insufficiently represented in corporate governance. The problem in the
United States is that fixed claimants are unable to protect themselves contractu-
ally from the moral hazard posed by the equity-dominated corporate borrowers.
Both of these deficiencies in corporate governance structures raise the cost of
capital and reduce allocational efficiency. Rather than investing resources in
copying each others' systems, each system would profit by focusing on, and
repairing, its own problems.
191. See, ag., Helen Garten, Institutional Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RuTGERS L.
REv. 585, 590-91 (1992) (describing two models of institutional influence-the "stability" model and
the "profitability" model). Challenges to this trend are increasing. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Compara-
tive Aspects of Institutional Investment and Corporate Governance, in INsrTrTnIoNAL INVsrRS AND
CompoRA-E GovRNANcE, supra note 34, at 3, 13 (challenging the common wisdom that pension-fund
backed investors necessarily behave as typical equitable shareowners, and suggesting that they have
more in common with fixed claimants).
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